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This article argues that the international community
confers legitimacy upon the hegemonic use of force, even if the
intervention is prima facie illegal under international law. As
the Security Council unwillingly lends its support to the
exercise of hegemonic power through resolutions on the
maintenance and restoration of peace, structural pressure on
the law of the use of force is mounting. The completion of the
evolutionary process through the emergence of a new norm is,
however, not in sight.
The legitimacy of interventions of that kind is intimately
linked to the emergence of "world risk society."1 Indiscriminate
transnational violence, or threat thereof, is progressively taking
root as a long-term risk feature of contemporary international
relations. Armed activities at the periphery of the global
military system (militias with local agendas), actions of global
terror networks, or threats arising from states without internal
checks and balances constitute major risks to the alleged
"normality" of global society. As illegitimate violence increases,
it clashes with expanding legitimate counter-violence emanating
* Reader in Law, University of Bristol. I thank Oren Gross and the
participants of the 2006 Minnesota Journal of International Law Symposium on the
War on Terror for their input. Vaios Karavas, Steven Greer and Nick Tsagourias
have been invaluable discussion partners for a long time and I am grateful for their
ideas, comments, and critique. I am indebted to Maria Panezi for her research
assistance, and to Jocelyn L. Burgos for the editing.
1. For this concept, see Ulrich Beck, Living in the World Risk Society, 35
ECON. & Soc'Y 329 (2006).
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from the center of the global military and political system.
Hegemonic intervention is thus a constituent element of global
society's overall violent communication cycle.
Risk containment is the basis for the legitimacy of
hegemonic intervention in a two-sided paradox. On the more
visible side, the intervening powers assert legitimacy for
preventing the risk of spontaneous mega-violence 2 and for
protecting universal rights through world society-building. 3 On
the less visible side, the international community is compelled
to manage the risk of hegemonic intervention itself; in fact, it
has limited choice but to confer legitimacy upon the intervention
once it is initiated, as the risk of its failure would magnify the
destabilization of the global system, while its success would put
everyone better-off in comparison to the status-quo ante.
Hegemonic intervention is an extremely costly, risky, and
potentially destabilizing enterprise, but still of a very different
normative order than predatory and illegitimate regional armed
conflicts. Its alleged legality rests on grounds such as self-
defense, ex post or implicit authorization by the Security
Council, intervention upon invitation, or humanitarian
intervention. These legal justifications seem to overlap with the
more ambivalent form of "forcible countermeasures for the
2. The prefix "mega" is often used in recent academic literature: mega-
catastrophe, see Robert J. Rhee, Terrorism Risk in a Post-9/11 Economy: The
Convergence of Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government Action, 37 ARIz. ST. L.
J. 435 (2005); mega-risk, see Robert Walker, Under New Management: Science Policy
in a Republican House of Representatives, 8 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 257 (1995); mega-
law, see Marc Galanter, Mega-Law and Mega-Lawyering in the Contemporary
United States, in THE SOCIOLOGY OF THE PROFESSIONS: LAWYERS, DOCTORS, AND
OTHERS (Robert Dingwall & Philip Lewis, eds., Palgrace Macmillan 1983); mega-law
and mega-programs, see Oliver A. Houck, Environmental Law in Cuba, 16 J. LAND
USE & ENVTL. L. 1 (2000-2001).
3. "World society-building" is my translation of the German term
Verweltgesellschaftung, used by MATHIAS ALBERT, ZUR POLITIK DER
WELTGESELLSCHAFT 338 (Velbriick 2002). In a systems-theoretical perspective, the
term signifies the process of evolution and deterritorialization of various systems of
action and communication (for example, law, politics, economy, religion, media)
which claim their autonomy vis-A-vis the state and coalesce at a global level. See
Achilles Skordas, "Just Peace" Revisited: International Law in the Era of Asymmetry,
in TERRITORIAL CONFLICTS IN WORLD SOCIETY: MODERN SYSTEMS THEORY,
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND CONFLICT STUDIES (S. Stetter, ed., Routledge 2007).
The process of world society-building is narrowly correlated with the rising
significance of human rights as structural guarantees of societal pluralism. See Gert
Verschraegen, Human Rights and Modern Society: A Sociological Analysis from the
Perspective of Systems Theory, 29 J.L. & SOC'Y 258 (2002). For a glossary of the
terms used by systems theory, see HANS-GEORG MOELLER, LUHMANN EXPLAINED:
FROM SOULS TO SYSTEMS 215 (Open Court 2006).
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restoration of peace." Thus, the intervening powers enforce the
objectives of the international community and of the
international legal order on their own initiative, and despite the
questionable legality of their action, they do not incur state
responsibility, but have, in principle, the "obligation to
reconstruct."
This paper argues that hegemonic intervention lacks the
capacity to crystallize into a general principle of international
law. Its overall effectiveness is becoming increasingly doubtful,
and global actors, including the media and civil society,
aggressively oppose it, blocking its further evolution. However,
this form of use of force seems to be ingrained in the power
structure and legal architecture of the contemporary
international system as a predictable pattern of state conduct
and as a general principle of international legal relations,
The present paper is divided into three sections. In Section
I, the theoretical foundations and assumptions are laid down.
This section will define the conceptual contours of hegemonic
intervention and will analyze its sociological foundation, which
is related with the increase of decentralized violence in its
various forms. In addition, this section will clarify the meaning
of legitimacy, disassociating it from the broad idea of popular
support. It will also emphasize that legitimacy is generated
primarily by the UN Security Council and by the practice of
states and international organizations, and mirrored in the
evolution of the law of the use of force. On its turn, evolutionary
pressure is intimately connected with the prevention of mega-
risks arising from both, the increase of transnational violence
and the hegemonic intervention itself. Section II reviews the
practice of the United Nations Security Council, and explores
the various elements of the hegemonic intervention that have
been identified in the previous section. The interventions in
Kosovo (1999), Afghanistan (2001) Iraq (2003), and Lebanon
(2006) demonstrate the variations among instances of use of
force that might be considered as subscribing to the hegemonic
societal project. Lastly, Section III will integrate the various
elements of international practice into the concept of legitimate
hegemonic intervention as a general principle of international
legal relations.
The hegemonic intervention as a socio-legal concept does
not readily fit into the categories of international law. The
theoretical model proposed here aspires to explain the
incongruities of international practice by introducing the
2007]
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paradigm of a hybrid pattern of conduct, which is constantly
oscillating across the boundary that separates legality from
illegality.
I. THEORETICAL FOUNDATION OF THE HEGEMONIC
INTERVENTION
A. CONCEPT AND SOCIO-LEGAL BACKGROUND
Hegemonic intervention is undertaken at the periphery of
global society, in order to preserve peace at its center, including
the suppression of major threats to the global political, economic
and human rights order.4 Thus, such intervention is conceived
and implemented by major powers, formal alliances, or by
coalitions of the willing with the objective of preventing major
risks to global stability, but without a clear and unambiguous
legal basis or mandate in international law. Structural reform of
the target-state or territory is generally a main, but not
indispensable, component of the hegemonic intervention; though
establishing conditions conducive to good governance and the
rule of law is a dimension of the hegemonic project, the
hegemonic intervention should not be considered as identical
with regime change, as this term has been used with respect to
the war in Iraq.5
4. The center of the global society does not signify specific states or territories,
but rather the space of regular operations of function systems and activities,
including the location of the intelligence centers of global society; periphery
indicates the transition to the space of turbulence and of non-workable linkages
between function systems. The center/periphery distinction, as well as the concept of
hegemony, indicate the asymmetry of global society. For further references to
literature, see Skordas, supra note 3. In the context of the use of force, the term
"hegemonic powers" does not refer to specific countries, but to concentrations of
politico-military power that plan and carry out in the kind of military interventions.
From the very rich "hegemony" or "center/periphery" literature, see HEGEMONIE
GEPANZERT MIT ZWANG - ZIVILGESELLSCHAFT UND POLITIK IM STAATSVERSTANDNIS
ANTONio GRAMSCIS (Sonja Buckel & Andreas Fischer-Lescano, eds, Nomos 2007);
LAW AND GLOBALIZATION FROM BELOW - TOWARDS A COSMOPOLITAN LEGALITY
(Boaventura de Sousa Santos & Cdsar Rodriguez-Garavito, eds, Cambridge
University Press 2005); BALAKRISHNAN RAJAGOPAL, INTERNATIONAL LAW FROM
BELOW (Cambridge University Press 2003); UNITED STATES HEGEMONY AND THE
FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, (Michael Byers & Georg Nolte, eds.,
Cambridge University Press 2003); U.S. HEGEMONY AND INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS (Rosemary Foot et al., eds., Oxford University Press 2003).
5. See Michael Reisman, Why Regime Change Is (Almost Always) a Bad Idea,
98 AM. J. INT'L. L. 516 (2004). However, the author misses the point, when he
distinguishes humanitarian intervention as a "short-term initiative" from the
[Vol. 16:2
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Structural change does not indeed need to be spelled out as
the explicit legal or political justification of the intervention. It
suffices that a link is factually established between the use of
force and a process for achieving long-term stability in the area
of intervention. It is another, but related, question whether
these ends are feasible, or under what conditions they might be
achieved. 6 The assertion is not that hegemonic intervention is
desirable or even effective in restoring peace and stability, but
that it might be legitimate, even if it fails to achieve its goals.
Again, legitimacy is not defined by popular support for the use
of force but rather by the institutional support of states, and of
the international community.7
The origins and elements of hegemonic intervention as a
hybrid socio-legal form of the use of force can be traced back to
some incoherent and disparate practices of the Cold War,
including the Reagan and Brezhnev doctrines, and incidents like
the preventive Israeli attack against the Osiraq nuclear reactor
in Iraq in 1981.8 However, the intervention in its current form is
the outcome of the particular circumstances that facilitated the
emergence of generalized and decentralized political violence in
the post-1990s.9 There are three major instances of intensified
violence in the post-Cold War era: a) violence from the periphery
of the global military system, b) global terrorism, and c)
violence, or threat thereof, from the periphery of the global
political system. Hegemonic intervention has been the
legitimate-but not necessary legal-response to these forms of
illegal and illegitimate violence. 10
Military and security has become a global system with its
own defining features through a centuries-long evolutionary
"future-oriented" regime change. Id. at 517. As the Kosovo case clearly
demonstrates, humanitarian intervention is intimately connected with institution-
building and structural domestic reform.
6. See infra, note 196.
7. See infra, note 32.
8. See, e.g., Anthony D' Amato, Israel's Air Strike Against the Osiraq Reactor:
A Retrospective, 10 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 259 (1996); David Fidler, War, Law and
Liberal Thought: The Use of Force in the Reagan Years, 11 ARiz. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
45 (1994); Nicholas Rostow, Law and the Use of Force by States: The Brezhnev
Doctrine, 7 YALE J. WORLD PUB. ORDER 209 (1980-1981); Anthony Winer, The
Reagan Doctrine, the 2003 Invasion of Iraq and the Role of a Sole Superpower, 22 L.
& INEQ. 169 (2004).
9. For a sociological approach to modem warfare, see Klaus Schlichte, World
Society and War, in TERRITORIAL CONFLICTS IN WORLD SOCIETY, supra, note 3..
10. On the distinctions with respect to the war in Iraq, see Anne-Marie
Slaughter, An American Vision of International Law?, 97 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROCS.
125 (2003).
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process." Over time, military violence was "tamed" by the
political system, which ultimately came to possess a monopoly
on the use of force, and by international organizations, such as
NATO and the UN.12 Nonetheless, the world military system is
characterized by the divide between center and periphery: In
various areas of conflict and inherent instability, military and
paramilitary groups confront, and dominate the political system,
and this leads to the breakdown of state structures.
Indeed, the first generation of armed conflicts in the post-
Cold War era, including those in the successor states of the
former Yugoslavia and in Africa, has been characterized by the
progressive breakdown of order and effective government.13 The
increasing influence of the military cannot be appropriately
characterized as the classical form of the "coup d'Etat" that
maximizes the authority of the organized military in the
political system. The problem should be properly reformulated
in the more radical form of "warfare as governance," in the
sense of policies deliberately axed on cannibalization and pillage
of natural resources, destruction of state structures, and
redefinition of territory and population through ethnic
cleansing. 14  The Kosovo intervention was the hegemonic
11. Gorm Harste, Society's War: The Revolution of a Self-Referential Military
System, in OBSERVING INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: NIKLAS LUHMANN AND WORLD
POLITICS 157 (Mathias Albert & Lena Hilkermeier, eds., Routledge 2004). On the
law of armed conflict as internal program of action of the military in modern
warfare, see DAVID KENNEDY, OF WAR AND LAW (Princeton University Press 2006).
12. UN General Assembly Res. 55/96 on the promotion and consolidation of
democracy calls upon states to ensure "that the military remains accountable to the
democratically elected civilian government," and this constitutes an element of the
rule of law, U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/96 I 1(c)(ix), (Feb. 28, 2001). Under the U.N.
Charter, resolutions by the Security Council, including those under Chapter VII,
need to be taken by nine of the fifteen members, including the concurring votes of
the permanent members. U.N. Charter art. 27, para. 3. On the voting in the Security
Council, see Bruno Simma et al., Art. 27, in THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS:
A COMMENTARY (Bruno Simma, ed., Oxford University Press 2002). NATO takes its
decisions by consensus. See NATO HANDBOOK 33,, available at http://www.nato.int.
13. This phenomenon is known as the "failed" or "juridical" state. See Colin
Warbrick, States and Recognition in International Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAW 243-
47 (Malcolm Evans, ed., 2d ed., Oxford University Press 2006). On the consequences
of the failure of the legal order, see Mark Massoud, Rights in a Failed State:
Internally Displaced Women in Sudan and Their Lawyers, 21 BERKELEY J. GENDER,
L. & JUST. 2 (2006).
14. On the particular features and forms of these conflicts, see Case
Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v.
Uganda), 2005 I.C.J. 116 (December 19, 2005)'Report of the Independent Inquiry into
the Actions of the United Nations during the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda, U.N. Doc.
S/1999/1257 (December 16, 1999); Report of the International Commission of Inquiry
on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. S/2005/60 (Feb. 1,
[Vol. 16:2
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response to a conflict of that kind, because the instability at the
periphery risked destabilizing the center.1 5
The case of terrorism is trickier. Terror represents the
second generation of post-Cold War conflicts, and should not be
confused with the periphery of the organized military system, as
it has developed into an autonomous system of a different order.
Terrorism as a global system of action emerges out of the
particularities of post-modern society. Though individual or
collective terrorist acts have been part of the political tradition
in a variety of cultures, including, in particular, the West,16 the
terrorist attacks of 9/11 constitute the "hegemonic act" that
established the global system of terror.17
Following this foundational moment, terrorist acts taking
place in various locations and regions are no longer observed as
isolated incidents nor are they solely assessed in terms of the
numbers of victims. Terrorist acts are now being perceived and
evaluated according to their connectivity and message, which
relates to the responsibility of the center to restore a global
order that excludes exclusion.18 Participants in, and observers
of, generalized violence or armed conflicts have developed
expectations regarding the recognition of motives and
interpretation of acts, and terror plans are prepared in view of
escalation, media attention, and expected responses.
After the 9/11 attacks, anti-terror legislation was enacted
within a matter of weeks, followed by administrative practice, 19
2005); Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources
and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, U.N. Doc.
S/2002/1146 (Oct. 16, 2002)'Report of the UN Secretary-General pursuant to General
Assembly resolution 53/35 - The fall of Srebrenica, U.N. Doc. A/49/549, (Nov. 15,
1999).
15. See infra, Section II.A.
16. On the West German terrorism of the 1970s and the state of mind of that
era, see STEFAN AUST, DER BAADER-MEINHOF KOMPLEX (Hoffmann und Campe
2005).
17. On the concept of the political and on the concept of hegemonic act in
systems-theoretical perspective, see URS STAHELI, SINNZUSAMMENBROCHE 230
(Verbruick 2000).
18. See Dirk Baecker, Disseits von Gut und Bose, in TERROR IM SYSTEM: DER
11. SEPTEMBER UND DIE FOLGEN 201, 210-212 (Dirk Baecker et al., eds., Carl-Auer-
Systeme Verlag 2002).
19. Within the United States, the Patriot Act was enacted on October 26, 2001
(Public Law 107-56), one and a half months after the September 11 attacks. On
November 13 of the same year, the President issued a Military Order on the
"Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against
Terrorism", Mil. Order No. 57,833, Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 16, 2001). On March 21,
2002, the Department of Defense issued Military Commission Order No. 1. See 41
ILM, 725 (2002). On March 12, 2002, the Inter-American Commission on Human
20071
MINNESOTA JouRNAL OF INT'L LAW
and military action was undertaken against terrorist groups
and the alleged host states. The terror system emerged within a
very short period of time, and its (ir)rationality infiltrated and
partially reoriented the operations of the political and the
economic systems.20 The emergence of the system of terror-
including anti-terror policies of all kinds-has already developed
its own "world" and conceptual horizon. 21 The war against
Afghanistan and the saga of the "global war on terror"22 respond
to the emergence of terrorism as a global system of political
and/or religiously motivated violence. Transnational violence
takes hold and attains a more structured form23 in comparison
to the first generation of conflicts.
In the third generation of conflicts, the center/periphery
distinction is applicable to the global political system itself. The
lack of domestic checks and balances in local political systems is
evidenced by strong linkages between military power and
religion (Iran)24 or by the "structural and actual" violence of
totalitarian political systems (Baathist Iraq,25 North Korea26).
Rights adopted its Decision on Request for Precautionary Measures on the
Detainees at Guantdnamo Bay, Cuba. Id. at 532. On April 15, 2002, the United
States submitted its response. Id. at 1015.
20. See IAN LUSTICK, TRAPPED IN THE WAR ON TERROR (University of
Pennsylvania Press 2006). On the structural implications of terrorism in the
economy, see Rhee, supra note 2.
21. See generally PETER FUCHS, DAS SYSTEM "TERROR" - VERSUCH UBER EINE
KOMMUNIKATIVE ESKALATION DER MODERNE (transcipt Verlag 2004). See also
TERROR IM SYSTEM, supra note 18.
22. Authorization for the Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat.
224, § 2(a) (2001).
23. See generally ULRICH SCHNECKENER, TRANSNATIONALER TERRORISMUS -
CHARAKTER UND HINTERGRUNDE DES "NEUEN" TERRORISMUS (Suhrkamp 2006).
24. See Louis Ren6 Beres, Israel, Iran, and Nuclear War: A Jurisprudential
Assessment, 1 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF., 65 (1996) (recounting early
international implications of this relationship). See also Amir Azaran, NPT, Where
Art Thou? The Nonproliferation Treaty and Bargaining: Iran as a Case Study, 6 CHI.
J. INT'L L. , 415 (2005). See also Neil Shevlin, Comment, Velayat-E Faqih in the
Constitution of Iran: The Implementation of Theocracy, 1 U. PA. J. CONST. L. , 358
(1998) (noting the totalitarian and militant character of the Iranian political system)
and Timothy Garton Ash, Soldiers of the Hidden Imam, 52 THE NEW YORK REVIEW
OF BOOKS 17, (Nov. 3, 2005). See also Matthias Kiintzel, A Child of the Revolution
Takes Over - Ahmadinejad's Demons, THE NEW REPUBLIC, April 24, 2006, available
to subscribers at http://www.tnr.com/showBio.mhtml?pid=888&sa=l (last accessed
on 05/12/07).
25. See Nathan J. Brown, Constitutionalism, Authoritarianism, and
Imperialism in Iraq, 53 DRAKE L. REV., 923 (2005) (recounting the authoritarian
constitutional tradition of Iraq).
26. See Dae-Kyu Yoon, The Constitution of North Korea: Its Changes and
Implications, 27 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1289 (2004). See also Chin Kim & Timothy G.
[Vol. 16:2
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Under the strong pressure of the globalization process that puts
the very existence of authoritarian societal orders at risk, the
preparedness of the above states to have recourse to force is
strengthened. Here, the problem could be formulated as
"calculated ambiguity" with respect to risk and to the real
possibility of recourse to indiscriminate violence, including
through Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) that cause
massive loss of life and disruption of societal activities all over
the world.27  The war against Iraq exemplifies the
miscalculations and huge risks of the hegemonic intervention,
as well as the failure of communication between the center and
the periphery of the global political system. 28
Transnationalism escalates the potential for violence, as
terrorism and interstate and domestic conflicts with ethnic or
religious character are merging together to expand and
differentiate patterns of violence. Israel's simulation of a
hegemonic intervention in Lebanon, 29 Somalia's puzzle,30 and
Iraq's quagmire31 circumscribe broadening conflicts, in which
state and non-state actors confront each other through the use
of force and often without clear strategic objectives. Hegemonic
intervention has become a constituent part of that
Kearley, The 1972 Socialist Constitution of North Korea, 11 TEX. INT'L L. J. 113
(1976).
27. See Lee Feinstein & Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Duty to Prevent, 83 FOREIGN
AFF. 1, 136 (2004). For the Iraqi case, see infra Section II.C(1).
28. This is particularly visible with respect to the failure of intelligence. See
infra, note 197.
29. See infra, Section II.D.
30. With respect to the developments in Somalia in 2006-2007 (assumption of
power by the Union of Islamic Courts, Ethiopian intervention on December 23, 2006
and return of the Transitional Government in Mogadishu), see the Statements of the
President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/2006/31 (July 13, 2006) and
U.N. Doc. S/PRST/2006/59 (Dec. 22, 2006). See also S.C. Res. 1724 U.N. Doc
S/RES/1724 (Nov. 29, 2006) and S.C. Res. 1725, U.N. Doc S/RES/1725 (Dec. 6, 2006).
Regarding the Ethiopian intervention, see Thank You and Goodbye, ECONOMIST,
Jan. 6, 2007, at 10. See also By Dawn the Islamists Were Gone, id., at 41-42. On
the United States' military involvement, see This Time It's Revenge, ECONOMIST,
Jan. 13, 2007, at 41-42. There has been an impressive lack of protest against the US-
Ethiopian intervention, and only one meeting of the UN Security Council was held
on December 26, S/PV.5614. In this meeting, the Special Representative of the U.N.
Secretary-General briefed the members of the Council on the ongoing crisis, but no
member of the Council took the floor, and no further meetings of the Council were
held until February 20, 2007. S.C. Res. 1744/2007, unanimously adopted at that
date, authorized member states of the African Union under Chapter VII to establish
a security mission in Somalia and support the Transitional Government. S.C. Res.
1744, 4, U.N. Doc S/RES/1744 (Feb. 20, 2007). The resolution also determined the
basic principles that should govern the political process. Id. at $T 1-3.
31. See infra, note 145.
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communication cycle and claims its own idiosyncratic
legitimacy. This is based on the response of states and
international institutions to a paradoxical double risk: risk
engendered by the novel forms of transnational violence and
risk of failure of the hegemonic intervention itself.
B. LEGITIMACY
The legitimacy of the hegemonic intervention does not
mirror the degree of acceptance of the intervention by the
broader public but rather signifies the institutional support of,
and acceptance by, the international community.32 In this sense,
it links risk with evolution: if international actors set the
prevention of certain forms of risk as an objective of the
international community, then legally relevant practice might
favor hegemonic intervention and exercise evolutionary
pressure upon the Charter's rules prohibiting the use of force.
1. Risk
Risk has become a structural feature of contemporary
society,33 and risk management permeates in practice all fields
of social life.34 Risks linked to the use of force need thus to be
embedded and viewed in this broader context. States are
motivated to respond to violence by ensuring the security of
their territories, citizens, and residents; the authorities are
obligated to take measures to prevent the occurrence of mega-
harms and to maintain order within the sphere of state's
jurisdiction. Failure to do so can amount to violations of
individual rights, such as the right to life. 35 The potentially
32. See NIKLAS LUHMANN, A SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY OF LAW 201 (Elizabeth
King & Martin Albrow trans., Routledge & Kegan Paul 1985) (noting, "the
institutional aspect of legitimacy is lodged neither in a value deduction nor in the
factual diffusion of conscious consensus, but in the assumption of acceptance.").
33. See Beck, supra note 1. See also ULRICH BECK, WELTRISIKOGESELLSCHAFr-
AUF DER SuCHE NACH DER VERLORENEN SICHERHEIT (Suhrkamp 2007); ULRICH
BECK, RISIKOGESELLSCHAFr - AUF DEM WEG IN EINE ANDERE MODERNE (Suhrkamp
1986) and NIKLAs LUHMANN, RISK: A SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY (Rhodes Barrett trans.,
Walter de Gruyter 1993).
34. See, e.g., Malcolm Feeley & Jonathan Simon, The New Penology: Notes on
the Emerging Strategy of Corrections and its Implications, 30 CRIMINOLOGY, 449
(1992) (explaining the turn of criminal law theory and practice from the individual
to the postmodern "actuarial consideration of aggregates," risk, and prevention). See
also Lisa L. Miller, Looking for Postmodernism in All the Wrong Places:
Implementing a New Penology, 41 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 1, 168 (2001).
35. The European Court of Human Rights determined as follows the positive
[Vol. 16:2
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devastating consequences of that kind of violence are not the
byproduct but the telos of the respective activities.
The counter-discourse on the "responsibility to protect,"36
the "duty to prevent,"37  and the principle of "civilian
inviolability" 38  illustrates the corresponding inflation of
legitimacy claims, which relate to the potential use of force for
the protection of major interests of the international
community.39 Thus, on the level of societal discourse, the
distinction between illegitimate and legitimate claims on the
use of force is similar to the communication cycle regarding
"violence versus counter-violence." On this level of pre-legal
claims, the concept of legitimacy with respect to the hegemonic
intervention is still nebulous and unstructured; however, it
reflects the primordial societal pressure upon the legal system,40
obligation of states to provide protection to individuals under Art. 2 of the European
Convention on Human Rights (right to life):
It is common ground that the State's obligation in this respect extends
beyond its primary duty to secure the right to life by putting in place
effective criminal-law provisions to deter the commission of offences
against the person backed up by law-enforcement machinery for the
prevention, suppression and sanctioning of breaches of such provisions. It
is thus accepted . . . that Article 2 of the Convention may also imply in
certain well-defined circumstances a positive obligation on the authorities
to take preventive operational measures to protect an individual whose life
is at risk from the criminal acts of another individual.
Osman v. the United Kingdom, 23452/94 Eur. Ct. H.R. 101, 115 (1998). In another
case, the Court affirmed that the state has the obligation to protect the lives of
individuals from risks related to activities of contra-guerilla groups. See Mahmut
Kaya v. Turkey, 22535/93 Eur. Ct. H.R. 129, $$ 85-101 (2000). See also ALASTAIR
MOwBRAY, THE DEVELOPMENT OF POSITIVE OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE EUROPEAN
CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS BY THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 15-22
(Hart 2004).
36. See GARETH EVANS & MOHAMED SAHNOUN, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO
PROTECT: REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON INTERVENTION AND STATE
SOVEREIGNTY (2001).
37. See Lee Feinstein & Anne-Marie Slaughter, supra note 27.
38. Anne-Marie Slaughter & William Burke-White, An International
Constitutional Moment, 43 HARV. INT'L L.J., 1 (2002).
39. See, e.g., HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION - ETHICAL, LEGAL, AND POLITICAL
DILEMMAS (J.L. Holzgrefe & Robert Keohane eds., Cambridge University Press
2003) and NICHOLAS TSAGOURIAS, JURISPRUDENCE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE
HUMANITARIAN DIMENSION (Manchester University Press 2000) (evidencing the
debate on the humanitarian intervention).
40. Proto-juridical ethical norms are emerging on the level of international
relations as byproducts of violations of human body, or of the ecological foundations
of human life. The question is whether and under what conditions they can find
access to the formal legal system. See Niklas Luhmann, Ethik in Internationalen
Beziehungen, 50 SOZIALE WELT, 247 (1999).
MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT'L LAW
which formally recognizes legal recourse to force only under the
restrictive conditions set out in Chapters VII and VIII of the UN
Charter.
Hegemonic intervention seeks its legitimacy in the
prevention of harm that originates from the intensification of
violence at the periphery of global society. Intuitively, it seems
that the legitimacy of the intervention depends on its
effectiveness. Should the intervening powers succeed in
restoring peace, and achieving "good governance," legitimacy, in
principle, should not be denied. Should they fail, the
intervention is expected to be placated as illegitimate. This
course of reasoning would make any further discussion on
legitimacy superfluous, as it would subsume legitimacy under
effectiveness.
It is without any doubt that the effective prevention of
mega-harms and the suppression of threats would greatly
contribute to the popular and institutional acceptance of
hegemonic intervention. However, it is necessary to take
account of the second dimension, too, and view the hegemonic
intervention as a mega-risk of its own: the enterprise of
suppressing or removing the risk of transnational violence, or of
bringing forward the modernization of the socio-political
structures of the target state or territory by compulsion is an
extraordinarily complex task to accomplish, and the
intervention may succeed or fail in that respect.41
Paradoxically, this inherent risk does not diminish but, instead,
enhances and stabilizes the legitimacy of the intervention.
Legitimacy is not the result of effectiveness at the end of the
process alone; legitimacy emerges within the process of risk
prevention and of enforcing reform, during which the
institutional support of the international community may
emerge, or not emerge. In this sense, legitimacy is intimately
linked to the fundamental normative values of the international
community and is detached from the political perceptions on
success or failure. Instead of focusing on the results, it might be
more appropriate to focus on the medium itself.
State-building and democratization are long-term objectives
of the international community; the United Nations and its
member states have attempted to realize this Grand Project
41. On the risk of terrorism and of the preventive measures against it, see
Klaus Japp, Zur Soziologie des fundamenalistischen Terrorismus, 9 SOZIALE
SYSTEME 54, 82-84 (2003).
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since the end of the Cold War,4 2 utilizing a variety of paths and
methods. Hegemonic intervention is one of the mechanisms that
have been used-successfully or unsuccessfully-to trigger or
support domestic reform and good governance. Thus, the
intervention generates a mega-risk for the international
community; while such use of force may, if it succeeds, promote
the stabilization of global order, it can also contribute to its
fundamental destabilization, if it fails. Outright rejection of an
intervention that might promote the international interest as
illegal and the strict implementation of the rules on
international state responsibility, including the re-
establishment of the status-quo ante,43 would create legal and
political conditions conducive to the further breakdown of global
order.
If the intervention constitutes a mega-risk, then the
international community, acting, in principle, but not
exclusively, through the UN Security Council, has to manage its
consequences and prevent the disaster of its potential failure.
Successful risk management is not impossible, and the
hegemonic powers are willing to negotiate the terms of the deal.
Though they have recourse to force without the consent of the
international community, or even despite the open disagreement
of the UN member states, they need the institutional support of
the system to achieve their objectives. Therefore, and
subsequently to the initiation of hostilities, the Security Council
does not indeed take "full responsibility" for the crisis, but its
member states negotiate packages of measures to safeguard the
transition to the new order proposed and envisaged by the
42. The comprehensive concept can be seen in the Agendas for Peace,
Development, and Democratization of the former UN Secretary-General Boutros
Boutros-Ghali. See Agenda for Peace, U.N. Doc. A/47/277 (June 17, 1992);
Supplement to an Agenda for Peace, U.N. Doc. A/50/60 (Jan. 3, 1995); Agenda for
Development, U.N. Docs. A/48/689 (Nov. 29, 1993), A/48/935 (May 6, 1994), A/49/665
(Nov. 11, 1994); and Agenda for Democratization, U.N. Doc. A/51/761 (Dec. 20, 1996).
See also Seth Jones & James Dobbins, The UN's Record in Nation Building, 6 CHI. J.
OF INT'L L. 703 (2006); William Maley, Democratic Governance and Post-Conflict
Transitions, 6 CHI. J. OF INT'L L.683 (2006).
43. According to Art. 35 of the International Law Commission's (ILC) articles
on state responsibility, "[a] State responsible for an internationally wrongful act is
under an obligation to make restitution, that is, to re-establish the situation which
existed before the wrongful act was committed." G.A. Res. 56/83, Annex, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/56/83 (Jan. 28, 2002). This provision, taken literally, would mean that the
intervening powers would be obliged to unconditionally re-establish the previous
authoritarian rule and withdraw their forces from the territory in question. See also
Arts. 40 and 41 of the International Law Commission's (ILC) articles on state
responsibility.
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intervening powers. As international practice demonstrates, the
Security Council lends the necessary support and legitimacy to
the intervention and its objectives in various stages of the
conflict, including after the termination of hostilities, but
without explicitly approving the use of force by the intervening
powers in the terms of Articles 42 or 53 of the UN Charter.44
This system of reciprocally regulated risk is completed with
the intervening powers' own legal risk: if the intervention is not
deemed to protect broader international interests, the
international institutions and third states will have no reason to
manage its consequences and contribute to its success. Under
these circumstances, the use of force will be neither legitimate,
nor privileged. International institutions or third states
concerned can respond by activating various forms of the
international state responsibility of the aggressor, or by
instituting criminal proceedings against the individuals
involved.
2. Evolution of the Law of the Use of Force
Evolution of the legal system, of a normative complex, or of
legal regime is the process of variation, selection, and re-
stabilization or retention of elements or structures of the legal
system or of specific fields of law.45 Variation is conceptualised
as a deviation in the reproduction of the elements of the system,
as critique, or as negation of the existing norms; variation
produces material relevant for evolution, which is usually lost
and rejected.46 Selection changes the structures; through
selection, the event is condensed into a normative structure,
44. See infra, Section II.
45. On the concept, process and stages of societal evolution and evolution of
law, see NIKLAS LUHMANN, DIE GESELLScHAFr DER GESELLSCHAFr 413-594
(Suhrkamp 1997); NIKLAS LUHMANN, LAW AS A SOCIAL SYSTEM, 230-73 (Klaus
Ziegert trans.) (Oxford University Press 2004); Gunther Teubner, Evolution of
Autopoietic Law, in AUTOPOIETIC LAW: A NEW APPROACH TO LAW AND SOCIETY 217
(Gunther Teubner ed., Walter de Gruyter 1987); A.G. Keller, Law in Evolution, 28
YALE L. J. 769 (1919); W. Jethro Brown, Law and Evolution, 29 YALE L. J. , 394
(1920); Jacob Henry Landman, Primitive Law, Evolution, and Sir Henry Sumner
Maine, 28 MICH. L. REV.404 (1930); Robert Clark, The Interdisciplinary Study of
Legal Evolution, 90 YALE L. J. 1238, 1238 (1980-1981); E. Donald Elliott, The
Evolutionary Tradition in Jurisprudence, 85 COLUM. L. REv.38 (1985); Mark Roe,
Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics, 109 HARV. L. REV.641 (1996). See also
recently Marc Amstutz & Vaios Karavas, Rechtsmutation: Zu Genese und Evolution
des Rechts im transnationalen Raum, 8 RECHTSGESCHICHTE 14 (2006).




which anchors itself in the memory of the system. 47 Retention
marks the consolidation and crystallization of the evolutionary
achievement in the system, such as the codifications in the legal
system,48 or the emergence of a new norm or legal principle. The
question here is whether hegemonic intervention has evolved
into the rank of a rule of international law, either in the form of
custom or as a general principle of international law.
The Cold War era was marked by variation, as evidenced by
unilateral, allegedly legitimate, breaches of the prohibition of
the use of force.49 However, the ICJ Nicaragua Judgment was
sufficiently clear so that, despite variation, no stabilization of a
new norm favoring intervention was visible. 0 In the post-Cold
War era, the UN Security Council offered a forum for the
interaction of states that became, for a number of reasons, a
main vehicle for the evolution of the law of the use of force. In
this capacity, the Council led the evolution to the stage of
selection. 51 The reasons for that capacity of the Council are
manifold.
First, the emerging, but often ambivalent, consensus among
the permanent members enabled the Council to make binding
decisions and adopt a rich body of "jurisprudence" on the use of
force.5 2 The Council does not directly make any pronouncements
on the basis of the distinction between legal and illegal conduct,
but it interprets the notions of the "threat to the peace, breach
of peace or act of aggression" by subsuming specific acts or
situations under these terms; it then addresses regulatory acts
to the states involved in the conflict, and decides on the
enforcement of its decisions.53
The significance of the Security Council's action for the
evolution of the law of the use of force is apparent not only in
the presence, but also in the absence, of a clear-cut Chapter VII
authorization. The interpretation of the resolutions should then
reveal, whether recourse to force constitutes a threat to the
47. Id. at 476, 487.
48. Id. at 487.
49. See supra, note 8.
50. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 136,
292 (3) (June 27).
51. See infra, Section II.
52. For an overview of the relevant literature, legal framework, and activities
of the Security Council, see Michael Bothe, Peace-Keeping (648-700.), Nico Krisch &
Jochen Abr. Frowein, Introduction to Chapter VII (701-17) and Waldemar Hummer
& Michael Schweitzer, Chapter VIII, Regional Arrangements, Art. 52 (807-53) in
THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY, supra, note 12.
53. U.N. Charter, arts. 39-42.
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peace or whether force operates rather in the direction of
restoration of peace, by wholly or partly realizing the objectives
of the international community. Thus, the distinction between
threat to the peace and restoration of peace supersedes the
distinction between legality and illegality. The Council's action
distinguishes between legitimate and illegitimate use of force in
the context of the above dichotomy. The potential, but not
necessary, divergence between the two distinctions, legal and
illegal versus threat to and restoration of peace, is a major
feature of the hegemonic intervention.
Second, the Security Council is a main vehicle for the
evolution of the law on the use of force, although it is not an
organ of democratic representation of the international
community.5 4 The impact of the Council is derived from a
number of factors that confer upon its practice an increased
weight. The Charter conferred the primary responsibility for the
maintenance of international peace and security to the Security
Council despite, or rather because of, its "oligarchic" nature, as
the decisions of the organ represent the will of the major
political and military powers of the world.5 5 Concentrated
politico-military and societal power undermines the stability of
current status of the law of the use of force through the
expanding practice of the Council.56 Practice and opinio juris
sive necessitatis of the Council and of its members have a major
impact on the law of the use of force.
.Although preliminary consultations may be held in camera,
the statements of its members and the adoption of its decisions
are pronounced in public and scrutinized by global and regional
media. Security Council sessions are "world events" 57 and the
54. Efforts to democratize the system by expanding membership have failed,
for the time being. See the proposals of the Secretary-General, In Larger Freedom:
Towards Development, Security, and Human Rights for All, 167-70, U.N. Doc.
A/59/2005 (Mar. 21, 2005).
55. U.N. Charter art 24, para. 1. On the historical background of the
composition of the U.N. Security Council, see Jost DelbrUck, Article 24, YJV 1-2, in
THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY, supra, note 12.
56. Permanent members of the U.N. Security Council can be considered as
"specifically affected" states with respect to the evolution of the customary law of the
use of force, cf. North Sea Continental Shelf, (F.R.G. v. Den., F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969
I.C.J. 3, 42 (Feb. 20, 1969). On power and international law, see MICHAEL BYERS,
CUSTOM, POWER AND THE POWER OF RULES, 35-40 (Cambridge University Press
1999).
57. The term "world event" is used by Rudolph Stichweh, The Genesis of World
Public Sphere (Inst. for World Soc'y Stud., Univ. of Bielefeld, Working Paper, 2002),




participating governments are well aware of the political and
legal ramifications of their decisions on the domestic sphere, as
well as on the international plane. The Council is accountable to
the world public opinion, and the governments of the member
states to their domestic constituencies.
Third, and as a consequence of the above, the Council
appears as a "nomic community"5 8 that produces a network of
decisions and rules that interpret and apply the notion of peace,
either in the dimension of the threat, or in the dimension of
maintenance and restoration. The law of the Council defines
the concept of international peace and security, and mobilizes
the military, resources of the world community for that purpose,
redraws maps and borders, and secures--or puts at risk-the
livelihoods of millions of people around the world. The Council
determines the coordinates for the "risk management" of
violence, including violence emanating from the hegemonic
intervention, and orients the policy of the Organization to the
achievement of specific goals relating to the maintenance of
global stability. 9 The UN Security Council is the "centre of
power" in the UN system, not because it is at the top of the
institutional hierarchy and performs acts of a "world
government,"60 but because it has the authority to define the
direction of UN policy with respect to the above issues. Using
the terminology of Christine Bell in a different conceptual
context, we may argue that the Council's practice, taken
together with the response of states and other actors in
international relations, including, but not limited to, peace
58. See Robert Cover, Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARv. L. REV. 4 (1984). Cover
used terms such as "nomic insularity" and "nomic reserve," or "nomian autonomy of
a community," id. at 30, 33. On Cover's conceptualization, see Amstutz & Karavas,
supra note 45, at 23-25.
59. Under U.N. Charter art. 24, para. 1, the member states "confer on the
Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace
and security." Moreover, the Council has the authority to take binding decisions
under Art. 25 ("The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out
the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter.").
60. There is no hierarchical relationship between the Security Council and the
other principal organs of the United Nations. The ICJ may resolve any legal issue
between states, if it has jurisdiction, even if the Council is "seized of the matter."
Case Concerning U.S. Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980
I.C.J. 3, 40 (May 24, 1980). The UN General Assembly may exercise its own
powers of recommendation with respect to peace and security, even if the matter is
in the agenda of the Security Council. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a
Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 131, IT
24-28 (July 9, 2004).
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agreements, constitutes the lex pacificatoria6' that has
substantially altered the coordinates of the interpretation of the
law on the use of force.
Evidently, evolution of the law of the use of force is not
exclusively depending on the Security Council. State practice
beyond the Council is also important, and its significance may
rise if the decision-making capacity of the organ is blocked by a
renewed antagonism between permanent members.
Furthermore, the International Court of Justice (ICJ)
constitutes a forum of fundamental significance for the
evolution of international law.62 The Court's jurisprudence is an
indispensable dimension of the evolutionary process, and it
indicates whether variations or selections have indeed the
potential to stabilize into a new norm.
Here, there appears to be a certain "division of labor"
between Security Council and ICJ: If the Security Council is the
organ that operates mainly on the level of selection, the Court's
jurisprudence as subsidiary-or material-source of
international law63 can affirm the emergence of a new norm, or,
alternatively, can obstruct a certain evolutionary path by
stabilizing the existing normative patterns and rejecting
alternatives; or, finally, the jurisprudence can decide in favor of
undecideability by acquiescing to further selections, but without
steering them toward a fixed direction of normative change.
It is important to clarify the role of adjudication in this
latter alternative. The judicial function requires judgments to
distinguish between legal and illegal conduct, or to stipulate on
matters of state responsibility. Undecideability does not - and
should not - mean mere detection of gaps-in-law, because the
ICJ is obliged to offer guidance to states and to the international
community when dealing with substantive law. Nonetheless, the
Court may use legal-interpretive techniques to avoid
challenging the broader direction of normative change, or defer
61. Christine Bell, Peace Agreements: Their Nature and Legal Status, 100 AM.
J. INT'L L., 373, 407-12 (2006).
62. The U.N. Charter provides that "[tihe International Court of Justice shall
be the principal judicial organ of the United Nations." (art. 92). For Niklas
Luhmann, the courts occupy the center of the legal system, and legislation, or
contracts, its periphery. See LUHMANN, LAW AS A SOCIAL SYSTEM, supra note 45, at
293. Whether the center/periphery distinction is applicable in the field of
international law is an issue that cannot be dealt with here.
63. See Statute of the I.C.J. art. 38, para. l(d) (June 26, 1945). See also Alain
Pellet, Article 38, IT 301-19, in THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF
JUSTICE - A COMMENTARY (Andreas Zimmermann, Christian Tomuschat & Karin
Oellers-Frahm eds., Oxford University Press 2006).
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crystallization of the meaning of a norm to a future time.64
The Security Council, the state practice, and the ICJ are not
the only relevant locations for the evolution of the law of the use
of force, as there are other actors that may play a role in the
overall process of customary law-creation. The inhuman
consequences of modern warfare, and the widespread use of
interrogation techniques that have shocked the conscience of
mankind-the outrages of Abu-Ghraib 65 and Guantdnamo66-
are generating worldwide protest and disapproval capable of
enhancing customary law creation in the area of international
humanitarian law through opinio necessitatis and "Martens
Clause";6 at the same time, protest may block the emergence of
a more permissive principle on the use of force. Protest,
scandalization and colre publique mondiale68 may create thus a
counter-dynamic that opposes state practice and practice of the
Security Council. The protest against hegemonic intervention
becomes a factor in the evolution of the law on the use of force if
it dominates the global media system, which produces or
mirrors the trends of public opinion. 69 Through that avenue,
scandalization may obstruct the emergence of opinio juris,
which is necessary for the re-stabilization of a new norm of
customary law. Indeed, it can be argued that scandalization
functions in the exactly opposite direction, by lending support
to, and by stabilizing, the opinio juris for the existing principle
on the prohibition of the use of force. In global society, non-state
actors may have an impact in customary-law formation.7 0
64. See Infra, Section III in fine.
65. See the Taguba Report on Treatment of Abu Ghraib Prisoners in Iraq,
Article 15-6 Investigation of the 800th Military Police Brigade (2004), available at
http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/dod/taguba.pdf (last accessed on 05/12/07).
66. U.N. Comm'n on Human Rights, Situation of the Detainees at Guantcnamo,
U.N. Doc. E/CN.412006/120 (Feb. 15, 2006) (prepared by Leila Zerrougui et al.).
67. See Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, Case No. IT-95-16-T, Judgment, 527 (Jan.
14, 2000); Antonio Cassese, The Martens Clause: Half a Loaf or Simply a Pie in the
Sky?, 11 EuR. J. INT'L L. 187 (2000).
68. ANDREAS FISCHER-LESCANO, GLOBALVERFASSUNG: DIE
GELTUNGSBEGRUNDUNG DER MENSCHENRECHTE 67-99 (Velbrick 2005).
69. On the media system, see LUHMANN, DIE GESELLSCHAFT DER
GESELLSCHAFT, supra note 45, 1096-1109; NiKLAs LUHMANN, THE REALITY OF THE
MASS MEDIA (Kathleen Cross trans., Stanford University Press) (2000). On the
impact of the global media system in international customary law creation, see
Achilles Skordas, Hegemonic Custom?, IN UNITED STATES HEGEMONY AND THE
FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 320-27, supra note 4.
70. Arrest Warrant Case (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. 3, 153 (Feb.
14, 2002) (Van den Wyngaert, J., dissenting, 27). However, it seems that the role
20071
MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT'L LAW
II. THE PRACTICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS
The study of UN practice may reveal both the diversity and
the common features of hegemonic intervention. The
interventions in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq and the 2006
armed conflict between Israel and Hezbollah should be
examined through the lens of the hegemonic use of force. This
section explores: (1) whether or not the acts of the intervening
powers are normatively privileged, and (2) the ramifications of
the practice of the United Nations.
A. KosOvo (1999)
The intervention of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) in Kosovo was undertaken without proper authorization
by the UN Security Council, notwithstanding the fact that
previous resolutions of the Council had determined that the
situation in the province constituted a threat to international
peace and security.71 Long before the NATO intervention, the
Council made clear that the UN not only intended to stop the
violence in the region, but also to promote "an enhanced status
for Kosovo which would include a substantially greater degree of
autonomy and meaningful self-administration." 72 Accordingly,
it was to be expected that the restoration of peace would be
achieved not only through the termination of the presence of the
Yugoslav army in the province, but also through domestic
reform.
The intensification of the mass population exodus from
Kosovo and the increased risk of a humanitarian catastrophe
established the necessity for military action. At the eve of the
intervention, half a million people had already fled the region.73
The Kosovo crisis was more than a regional threat; it
of mass media in the formation of societal protest is constitutive, in comparison to
the more limited role of non-governmental organizations. The Human Rights Watch
Report ENDURING FREEDOM: ABUSES BY U.S. FORCES IN AFGHANISTAN (2004), was
initially barely noticed, as well as information of Amnesty International on the
torture of Iraqi prisoners of war (AFP, May 16, 2003), contrary to the global protest
that followed the publication of the Abu Ghraib torture photos in the mass media.
See, e.g., Seymour M. Hersh, The Gray Zone: How a Secret Pentagon Program Came
to Abu Ghraib, THE NEW YORKER, May 24, 2004; Susan Sontag, Regarding the
Torture of Others, THE N.Y. TIMES MAG.,May 23, 2004.
71. See S.C. Res. 1203, pmbl. T 15, U.N. Doc. . S/RES/1203 (Oct. 24, 1998); S.C.
Res. 1199, pmbl. $I 14, U.N. Doc.. S/RES/1199 (Sept. 23, 1998).
72. S.C. Res. 1160, T1 5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1160 (Mar. 31, 1998).




constituted a threat for the center of world society, since this
mass exodus risked destabilizing a large part of Europe and
triggering a major European war. U.S. President Bill Clinton
stressed this point in his statement at the day of the
commencement of the intervention.74
Despite good reasons, the "anticipatory intervention" in
Kosovo has been deemed prima facie illegal by the academic
literature, albeit with ambivalence and uneasiness.75 However,
the intervention should not be considered as an "act of
aggression"76 because such a determination depends on a
broader assessment of relevant circumstances. 77  Here, the
74. Clinton stated:
Kosovo is a small place, but it sits on a major fault line between Europe,
Asia and the Middle East, at the meeting place pf Islam and both the
Western and Orthodox branches of Christianity. To the south are our
allies, Greece and Turkey; to the north, our new democratic allies in central
Europe. And all around Kosovo there are other small countries struggling
with their own economic and political challenges, countries that could be
overwhelmed by a large, new wave of refugees from Kosovo. All the
ingredients for a major war are there: ancient grievances, struggling
democracies, and in the center of it all a dictator in Serbia who has done
nothing since the cold war ended but start new wars and pour gasoline on
the flames of ethnic and religious division.
Sean Murphy, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International
Law, 93 AM. J. INT'L L., 628, 630 (1999). On March 16, 1999, U.S. Department of
State spokesman James Rubin stated, inter alia, the following: "Serb actions also
constitute a threat to the region, particularly Albania and Macedonia and
potentially NATO allies, including Greece and Turkey." Id. at 631. Similar fears of
a regional destabilization on the Balkans had been expressed by President George
H.W. Bush with respect to the war in Bosnia on August 6, 1992 in Colorado Springs.
See Remarks on the Situation in Bosnia and an Exchange with Reporters in
Colorado Springs, Aug. 6, 1992, http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/papers/1992/
92080601.html.
75. See Antonio Cassese, Ex iniuria ius oritur: Are We Moving towards
International Legitimation of Forcible Humanitarian Countermeasures in the World
Community?, 10 EUR. J. INT'L L. 23 (1999) [hereinafter Ex iniuria ius oritur];
Antonio Cassese, A Follow-Up: Forcible Humanitarian Countermeasures and Opinio
Necessitatis, 10 EUR. J. INT'L L. 791 (1999); Bruno Simma, NATO, the UN and the
Use of Force: Legal Aspects, 10 EUR. J. INT'L L. 1 (1999). For more categorical
assessment of illegality, see Jonathan I. Charney, Anticipatory Humanitarian
Intervention in Kosovo, 93 AM. J. INT'L L., 834 (1999); Georg Nolte, Kosovo und
Konstitutionalisierung: Zur humanitdren Intervention der NATO-Staaten, 59 ZAORV
941 (1999).
76. Under article 39 of the U.N. Charter, the existence of an act of aggression is
determined by the U.N. Security Council. See also G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), U.N.. Doc.
A/RES/3314 (Dec. 14, 1974) (defining aggression).
77. Although the first use of force by a state constitutes prima facie evidence of
an act of aggression, this is an important, but not a conclusive, factor-"aggressive
intent" should also be present. Resolution on the Definition of Aggression, [19741 28
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wider international interest was indeed served by the
intervention, which had humanitarian purposes within the
framework of restoring peace in the region. NATO acted
without an explicit authorization, but within the objectives and
the context set by the resolutions of the UN Security Council. 78
Moreover, the Security Council had rejected by majority vote
and without the exercise of a veto, a draft resolution
characterizing the intervention as a "flagrant violation" of the
prohibition on the use of force. 79 The use of force against
Yugoslavia fulfilled at least the customary condition of
necessity,80 though, apparently, not of proportionality.8'
The agreement on the termination of hostilities was
concluded under the auspices of the G-8 Ministers of Foreign
Affairs but incorporated in a Security Council resolution under
Chapter VII.2 Under the terms of UNSC Resolution 1244/1999,
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was required to withdraw its
military, police and paramilitary forces from Kosovo, and thus
abandon the effective exercise of sovereignty over the province.8 3
At the same time, the Security Council authorized "Member
States and relevant international organizations to establish the
international security presence in Kosovo";8 4 moreover, the
U.N.Y.B. 843 art. 2.
78. Compare, e.g., S.C. Res. 1199, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1199 (Sept. 23, 1998), S.C.
Res. 1203, U.N. Doc.S/RES/1203 (Oct. 24, 1998) (delineating the obligations of the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia), and Press Release, U.N. Secretary-General,
Secretary-General Offers Conditions to End Hostilities in Kosovo, U.N. Doc.
SG/SM16952 (Apr. 9, 1999), with Press Release, NATO Secretary General, (1999)040
(Mar. 23, 1999), Press Release, NATO Secretary General, (1999)043 (Mar. 23, 1999),
Press Release, NATO Secretary General, (1999)042 (Mar. 25, 1999) (delineating the
objectives of NATO), and Press Release, NATO Heads of State and Government, S-
1(99)62 (Apr. 23, 1999) (statement on Kosovo issued by the Heads of State and
Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in
Washington, D.C.).
79. Belarus and Russian Federation: Draft Resolution, pmbl. 3, U.N. Doc.
S/1999/328 (Mar. 26, 1999). The draft resolution was rejected by 12 votes against,
and 3 in favor. See U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., 3989th mtg. at 6, U.N. Doc.S/PV.3989
(Mar. 26, 1999).
80. This was the prevailing view of the member states of the UNSC. See the
relevant statements in the sessions of U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., 3989th mtg. at 3,
U.N. Doc. S/PV.3989 (Mar. 26, 1999) and U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., 3988th mtg. at 12,
U.N. Doc. S/PV.3988 (Mar. 24, 1999).
81. This was due to the magnitude of the destruction and the intensity of the
bombing of Yugoslavia. See, e.g., The Secretary-General, Report of the Inter-Agency
Needs Assessment Mission, 9, 19, 44, 51, 56, U.N. Doc. S/1999/662 (June 14,
1999).





Council decided that KFOR (Kosovo Force), "with substantial
North Atlantic Treaty Organization participation [had to] be
deployed under unified command and control and authorized to
establish a safe environment for all people in Kosovo." 85 Thus,
since the Council adopted the above resolution under Chapter
VII of the Charter, 6 the deployment of NATO/KFOR forces
constituted a step for the restoration of peace; this was
recognition of the strong legitimacy of the intervention. Had the
intervention been illegal and illegitimate, the Council would
have had to either to condemn it, or not act at all, due the
exercise of a veto by the permanent members affected by such a
proposal.
Though the political agreement facilitated by the G-8 took
"full account of ... the principles of sovereignty and territorial
integrity of . . . Yugoslavia,"87 it also put the province under
international interim administration that would establish and
oversee "the development of provisional democratic self-
governing institutions to ensure conditions for a peaceful and
normal life for all inhabitants in Kosovo."88 Last but not least,
the international community undertook the obligation to
support the reconstruction of the region, the stability of which
was negatively affected by the Kosovo conflict, "including the
implementation of Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe with
broad international participation in order to further the
promotion of democracy, economic prosperity, stability and
regional cooperation."8 9
Whether U.N. Security Council Resolution 1244 constitutes
possibly an implicit ex post facto full authorization of the
intervention needs not be discussed here;90 what is clear,
however, is that the Council considered the objectives of the
intervention as consistent with its own policies and objectives
for the restoration of peace in the region. Another more
plausible interpretation is that armed force may be employed as
legitimate "forcible countermeasures" in which the international
community had in practice set the objective of restoration of
85. Id. annex 2 4.
86. Id. pmbl. 13.
87. The text of this statement of May 6, 1999 was incorporated as Annex I in
S.C. Res. 1244, annex 1, supra, note 82.
88. Id. annex 2 5.
89. Id. 17, annex 2 19.
90. See generally CHRISTIAN WALTER, VEREINTE NATIONEN UND
REGIONALORGANISATIONEN (1995) (detailed study on the pre-1995 practice of the
United Nations on Chapter VIII).
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peace, and the intervening powers enforced the relevant
resolutions, albeit without first securing the legal authority to
do so.91 Notably, Resolution 1244 treated the actions of the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as a threat to, and NATO's
intervention as a restoration of, peace. Illegal, but legitimate:
this was the conclusion of the U.N. Secretary-General on the
day the bombardment of Yugoslavia began.92
As a consequence of the "international interest" in the
management of the crisis, the rules on state responsibility were
implicitly suspended by U.N. Security Council Resolution 1244;
instead, Yugoslavia was treated as the party that had acted in
violation of international law. In a functional equivalent of
compensation for war damages, the Stability Pact was intended
to assist the reconstruction of the region and its re-integration
into the global economy.
B. AFGHANISTAN (2001)
The intervention in Afghanistan, following the 9/11 attacks,
rests also on a controversial legal basis, although self-defense
seems to be a prima facie argument in favor of the legality of the
intervention.
U.N. Security Council Resolution 1368, adopted on
September 12, 2001, was short of an explicit recognition of the
right of the United States to intervene in Afghanistan in self-
defense. Though the resolution condemned the terrorist attacks
and recognized in general terms the "inherent right of
individual or collective self-defense in accordance with the
Charter,"93 the formulation was less explicit than, for instance,
in U.N. Security Council Resolution 661. 94 This was perhaps
91. Cf Cassese, Ex iniuria ius oritur, supra note 75 (setting out criteria for
justified use of force in the absence of Security Council authorization, and arguing
that the NATO intervention in Kosovo met such criteria). However, in his follow-up
article, he concluded that forcible countermeasures were not authorized by
international law, supra note 75.
92. Press release, Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. SG/SM/6938 (Mar. 24, 1999):
"It is indeed tragic that diplomacy has failed, but there are times when the use of
force may be legitimate in the pursuit of peace .... But as Secretary-General I have
many times pointed out, not just in relation to Kosovo, that under the Charter the
Security Council has primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and
security.... Therefore the Council should be involved in any decision to resort to the
use of force".
93. S.C. Res. 1368, pmbl. T 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (Sept. 12, 2001).
94. See S.C. Res. 661, pmbl. 6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/661 (Aug. 6, 1990) (affirming
"the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence, in response to the armed
attack by Iraq against Kuwait, in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter").
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due to the factual uncertainties and legal ambiguities with
respect to the attribution of acts of non-state actors to a State.
The statement of the North Atlantic Council of the same date
activated, for the first time, but in a rather conditional form,
Art. 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty: "The Council agreed that if
it is determined that this attack was directed from abroad
against the United States, it shall be regarded as an action
covered by Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, which states that
an armed attack against one or more of the Allies in Europe or
North America shall be considered an attack against them all."95
A major element of ambiguity with respect to the exercise of
the right of self-defense is visible in the relationship between
Usama bin Laden and A1-Qaeda with the regime of Taliban and
Afghanistan as a state. Though it could make sense to attribute
the actions of Al-Qaeda to Afghanistan and establish the
existence of an armed attack, additional facts are necessary in
order to support such an attribution. Chapter II of the
International Law Commission's (ILC) Articles on State
Responsibility96 might be invoked to establish the link and to
attribute the conduct of the terrorist group to Afghanistan. In
the proceedings of the Yusuf case before the Court of First
Instance of the European Communities, the Council made the
argument that bin Laden was acting as an organ of the Afghan
state, eventually as the Head of State. 91
95. Press Release, N. Atl. Treaty Org., Statement by the North Atlantic Council
(2001)124 (Sept. 12, 2001) (emphasis added).
96. G.A. Res. 56/83, Annex, arts. 4-11, supra note 43.
97. See Case T-306/01, Yusufv. Council, 2005 E.C.R. 11-3533, 1 118. The Court
stated:
[T]he Council has added that Usama bin Laden was in fact the head and
'6minence grise' of the Taliban and that he wielded the real power in
Afghanistan. His temporal and spiritual titles of 'Sheikh' (head) and 'Emir'
(prince, governor or commander) and the rank he held beside the other
Taliban religious dignitaries can leave little doubt on that score. Moreover,
even before 11 September 2001, Usama bin Laden had sworn an oath of
allegiance ('Bay'a') making a formal religious bond between him and the
Taliban theocracy. He was thus in a situation comparable to that of Mr.
Milosevic and the members of the Yugoslav Government at the time of the
economic and financial sanctions taken by the Council against the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia .... With regard to A1-Qaeda, the Council has
observed that it was common knowledge that it had many military training
camps in Afghanistan and that thousands of its members had fought beside
the Taliban between October 2001 and January 2002, during the
intervention of the international coalition.
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The use of force against Afghanistan did not have as an
objective the repulsion of the alleged armed attack, since the
terrorist acts took place and were completed on September 11,
2001. The statement of the U.S. government of October 7, 2001
was clear on the objective of risk prevention 98 and also hinted to
the possibility of pre-emptive self-defense against other states.99
Two days after the statement of the U.S. government, the U.N.
Secretary-General said in an interview that this sentence "had
caused some 'anxiety' among other Member States" and that
"that is one line that disturbed some of us."100
However, even if the United States invoked the right of self-
defense, the use of force against Afghanistan served primarily
the general international interest for the eradication of
terrorism. In this sense, the recourse to the use of force
constituted enforcement of the objectives of the international
community; this justified, and required, the active involvement
of the Security Council.
Following the positive outcome of the conflict for the
United States and its allies, the U.N. Security Council played a
pivotal role in the formulation of the fundamental principles of
the new constitutional order of Afghanistan. The military
action of the United States did not have only the limited
objective of destroying the material infrastructure of the
terrorist organizations, but also the broader goal of reforming
the political system of Afghanistan. 10 1 These objectives were
98. The U.S. government stated:
The attacks on 11 September 2001 and the ongoing threat to the United
States and its nationals posed by the Al-Qaeda organization have been
made possible by the decision of the Taliban regime to allow the parts of
Afghanistan that it controls to be used by this organization as a base of
operation .... In response to these attacks, and in accordance with the
inherent right of individual and collective self-defence, United States
armed forces have initiated actions designed to prevent and deter further
attacks on the United States.
Letter from the Permanent Representative of the U.S. to the President of the Sec.
Council, U.N. Doc. S/2001/946 (Oct. 7, 2001) (emphasis added).
99. Id. ("There is still much we do not know. Our inquiry is in its early stages.
We may find that our self-defence requires further actions with respect to other
organizations and other States.").
100. October 9, 2001, transcript with the author.
101. In his November 10, 2001 speech in the U.N. General Assembly, President
George W. Bush stated:
The United States will work closely with the United Nations and
development banks to reconstruct Afghanistan after hostilities there have
ceased and the Taliban are no longer in control. And the United States will
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shared by the international community, as evident in Security
Council deliberations, including the meeting of November 13,
2001, the day Kabul fell to the Northern Alliance. 102 Despite the
effort of the Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary-
General for Afghanistan to attribute his proposals to other local
and regional actors, 0 3 the Representative for Singapore stressed
that, in face of the situation in the country, the Council should
act swiftly and formulate the principles that would guide the
political process and avoid disasters.0 4 Thus, the risk of
terrorism, and risks triggered by the intervention itself and by
the breakdown of the previous regime needed to be managed by
concerted action of the international community.
Following up its relevant resolutions under Chapter VII,
the Council did not limit itself to proposing principles for a new
political negotiation process; the Council actually formulated
the fundamental constitutional principles of the new legal order
of the country. In Resolution 1378, the Security Council defined
its objectives of uprooting terrorism, completing the political
process, and catalyzing domestic constitutional and political
reform.10 5 Pursuant to the Resolution, it was determined that
the new government of Afghanistan should be "broad-based,
multi-ethnic and fully representative," "should respect the
human rights of all Afghan people, regardless of gender,
ethnicity or religion," and "should respect Afghanistan's
international obligations, including by cooperating fully in
international efforts to combat terrorism and illicit drug
trafficking within and from Afghanistan."0 6  The Bonn
Agreements of December 5, 2001, concluded among all major
Afghan political parties, adopted these principles and
incorporated them into the foundational instruments of the new
State.10 7 On the following day, the U.N. Security Council
work with the U.N. to support a post-Taliban government that represents
all of the Afghan people.
Sean Murphy, Contemporary Practice of the United States, 96 AM. J. INT'L L., 237,
249-50 (2002).
102. See, e.g., U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., 4414th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/PV.4414 (Nov.
13, 2001).
103. See id. at 3-4 (statement of Lakhdar Brahimi).
104. Id. at 12 (statement of S. Jayakumar).
105. See S.C. Res. 1378, pmbl., U.N. Doc.. S/RES/1378 (Nov. 14, 2001).
106. Id. para. 1 of the oper. part (including principles for the transitional legal
order of the country).
107. See Letter from the Sec'y-Gen. to the President of the Sec. Council, U.N.
Doc. . S/2001/1154 (Dec. 5, 2001).
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endorsed the agreements and incorporated them into a
resolution on the restoration of peace. 08
The intervention in Afghanistan assumed a hegemonic
character, in that the exercise of the right of self-defense had
the objectives of preventing the risk of further terrorist attacks,
enforcing regime change, and creating a political and societal
environment considered conducive to the eradication of
terrorism. It can be argued that the military action
progressively assumed the character of an intervention upon
invitation, as the Northern Alliance was able to control a
considerable part of the territory, assume power, and
retroactively authorize the intervention. 109
The intervening powers and the United Nations followed
parallel paths of action designed to suppress the threat of
terrorism. The United Nations conferred legitimacy, but not
explicit legality, upon the military operation of the United
States and its allies; the United States pursued the objectives of
the United Nations with respect to the fight against
terrorism; 10 and the United Nations supported the project of
democratization and state-building in Afghanistan. Without a
doubt, the legality or legitimacy of the operation can be
supported on multiple grounds and for multiple reasons; at a
minimum it can be said that the intervention was legitimate,
but burdened with some uncertainties with regard to its
legality.' This tension is perhaps best reconciled by assessing
108. S.C. Res. 1383, pmbl. 1 5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1383 (Dec. 6, 2001).
109. Cf Michael Byers, Terrorism, the Use of Force and International Law After
September 11, 51 INT'L & COmp. L.Q., 401, 403-04 (2002) (discussing intervention by
invitation as a possible legal justification for the use of force against Afghanistan).
On intervention upon invitation, see generally GEORG NOLTE, EINGREIFEN AUF
EINLADUNG (Springer 1999).
110. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1368, pmbl. 2, supra note 93 (stating that the Security
Council is "determined to combat by all means threats to international peace and
security caused by terrorist acts") (emphasis added); see also S.C. Res. 1373, pmbl.
5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001) ("[rleaffirming the need to combat by all
means, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, threats to
international peace and security caused by terrorist acts") (emphasis added).
111. On the legality of the use of force against terrorism and against
Afghanistan, see Byers, supra note 109; Andreas Fischer-Lescano, Redefining
Sovereignty via International Constitutional Moments? The Case of Afghanistan, in
REDEFINING SOVEREIGNTY: THE USE OF FORCE AFTER THE COLD WAR 335-64
(Michael Bothe et al. eds., Transnational Publishers 2005); Marcelo G. Kohen, The
Use of Force by the United States After the End of the Cold War, and Its Impact on
International Law, in UNITED STATES HEGEMONY AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 4, at 204-11. See also W. Michael Reisman,




the use of force against Afghanistan as a form of forcible
countermeasures for the restoration of peace, whereby
democratic governance and domestic reform would be
considered as remedies corresponding to guarantees of non-
repetition of terrorist activities. 112
C. IRAQ (2003)
Despite the failure of the United States and its allies to
stabilize the situation in Iraq, the lack of any findings that this
country possessed weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and the
absence of an explicit authorization for the use of force, there
are numerous "legitimacy indicators" in pertinent Security
Council resolutions as well as in the reports of its subsidiary
weapons inspection organs (i.e., UNSCOM, UNMOVIC). 1 3
More than in any other case of hegemonic intervention, the
elements of uncertainty, risk containment, and regime change
are visible on all levels of the international community's
response and of the United States' stance towards Iraq.
The "root causes" for the legitimacy of the intervention are
related to the breach of confidence between UNSCOM and Iraq
in the mid 1990's.114 The uncertainties with respect to the
existence of WMD and to programs for manufacturing such
weapons, as well as the obstruction and suspension of
inspections over a long period of time, significantly contributed
to the escalation of tensions between Iraq and the international
community. In response, the Security Council requested that
Iraq comply with its disarmament obligations and disclose its
programs, threatening further sanctions and measures.
It is important to distinguish between moments of pre-war
and post-war legitimacy.11 5  Pre-war, the international
112. Art. 30(b) of the ILC Articles on international state responsibility provides
that "[tihe State responsible for the internationally wrongful act is under an
obligation ... [tlo ffer appropriate assurances and guarantees of non-repetition, if
circumstances so require." G.A. Res. 56/83, supra note 43, Annex, art. 30(b).
113. The United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) was established in
order to monitor the disarmament of Iraq by S.C. Res. 687, $1 9, U.N. Doc. S/RES/687
(Apr. 3, 1991). It was replaced by the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and
Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) established by S.C. Res. 1284, $ 1, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1284 (Dec. 17, 1999).
114. Achilles Skordas, La Commission spiciale des Nations Unies, in L'
EFFECTIVITE DES ORGANISATIONS INTERNATIONALES: MECANISMES DE SUM ET DE
CONTROLE 59, 75-77 (H.Ruiz-Fabri, L.-A. Sicilianos, & J.-M. Sorel eds., 2000).
115. I chose the term "war" instead of "armed conflict" in order to distinguish
the hostilities between the international coalition and the former Iraqi regime of
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community was concerned with the risk of Iraq possessing
WMD; post-war, legitimacy was built principally on the self-
determination of the people of Iraq.116
1. Pre-war Legitimacy
Though the UN Security Council did not explicitly authorize
the use of force against Iraq, Resolution 1441/2002 contained
grounds upon which to assert the legitimacy of the intervention.
Under its terms, "the Council has repeatedly warned Iraq that it
will face serious consequences as a result of its continued
violations of its obligations."" 7  In the preamble, the Council
recalled, "that its resolution 678/1990 authorized Member
States to use all necessary means to uphold and implement its
resolution 660/1990... and all relevant resolutions subsequent
to resolution 660/1990 and to restore international peace and
security in the area."118 The significance of that provision is that
it was the second time since the termination of hostilities in
1991119 that a UNSC resolution mentioned Resolution 678/1990
again.120
With Resolution 1441/2002, the Security Council
established that Iraq had been and remained in "material
breach" of previous resolutions, including Resolutions 686, 687,
and 688/1991.121 In particular, the Council referred to the
failure of Iraq to comply with its commitments with regard to
terrorism, disarmament, and repression of the civilian
population. 122 Notably, Resolution 688 had indeed linked the
restoration of peace with domestic political reform.123 Moreover,
Resolution 1441 afforded Iraq "a final opportunity to comply
Mar.-Apr. 2003 from the wider, still ongoing, conflict within Iraq.
116. The question of legality or illegality of the intervention generated a broad
and spirited academic debate. See Agora: Future Implications of the Iraq Conflict,
97 AM. J. INT'L L. 553, 803 (2003).
117. S.C. Res. 1441, 7 13, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1441 (Nov. 8, 2002).
118. Id. pmbl. 4.
119. S.C. Res. 687, U.N. Doc. S/RES/687 (Apr. 3, 1991).
120. S.C. Res. 678, U.N. Doc. S/RES/678 (Nov. 29, 1990) was mentioned only
once between 1991 and 2002, in the preamble of S.C. Res. 949, U.N. Doc. S/RES/949
(Oct. 15, 1994).
121. S.C. Res. 1441, supra note 117, pmbl. 1 9, oper. part 1.
122. Id.
123. S.C. Res. 688, 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/688 (Apr. 5, 1991) provided that Iraq
should "as a contribution to removing the threat to international peace and security
in the region, immediately end this repression, and in the same context expresses
the hope that an open dialogue will take place to ensure that the human and
political rights of all Iraqi citizens are respected."
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with its disarmament obligations" and to provide UNMOVIC,
IAEA and the Council "not later than 30 days from the date of
this resolution, a currently accurate, full, and complete
declaration of all aspects of its programmes" to develop WMD. 124
Thus, Iraq's obligation pursuant to Resolution 1441 was largely
procedural, and related to the declaration of its programs for the
development of WMD. Hans Blix stated to the Security Council
sixty days later that "[riegrettably, [Iraq's] 12,000 page
declaration ... [did] not seem to contain any new evidence that
would eliminate the questions or reduce their number."125
Though in subsequent reports he welcomed the more
cooperative stance of the Iraqi authorities, an UNMOVIC
Working Document on "Unresolved Disarmament Issues" dated
March 6, 2003, less than two weeks before the war, stressed
that Iraq might possess WMD. With respect to anthrax, for
instance, the document made an exemplary statement of risk
assessment:
Based on all the available evidence, the strong presumption is that
about 10,000 litres of anthrax was not destroyed and may still exist.
As a liquid suspension, anthrax spores produced 15 years ago could
still be viable today if properly stored. Iraq experimented with the
drying of anthrax simulants and if anthrax had been dried, then it
could be stored indefinitely. 126
This document was prepared under Resolution 1284/1999
and not under Resolution 1441/2002, but this does not undercut
the value of the risk assessment it provided at the critical period
preceding the war. 12 7
Moreover, Resolution 1441/2002 provided that the Council
should convene immediately upon receipt of the reports of the
UNMOVIC/LAEA "in order to consider the situation and the
need for full compliance with all of the relevant Council
resolutions in order to secure international peace and
124. S.C. Res. 1441, supra note 117, 2-3.
125. U.N. SCOR, 58th Sess., 4692d mtg. at 5, U.N. Doc. S/PV.4692 (Jan. 27,
2003).
126. U.N. Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Comm'n [UNMOVIC],
Working Document: Unresolved Disarmament Issues Iraq's Proscribed Weapons
Programmes, 98 (Mar. 6, 2003), available at
http://www.un.org/Depts/unmovic/new/documents/clusterdocument.pdf (last
accessed on 05/12/07)
127. See also the assessment of the Commission on anthrax in the Report it
submitted to the UN Security Council after the war, Thirteenth Quarterly Report of
the Executive Chairman of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and
Inspection Commission, paras. 13,92-96, , U.N. Doc. S/2003/580 (May 30, 2003).
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security."128 The Council did not refer to the necessity for a
second resolution authorizing the use of force against Iraq.
Although this question has been strongly disputed and debated
later, the discussion in the Council during the adoption of
Resolution 1441 was everything but equivocal. The US
representative was very explicit that a second resolution
authorizing the use of force would be politically desirable, but
not necessary, since Resolution 1441 contained such an
authorization. 129 The French, Russian and Chinese
representatives interpreted the resolution differently, but
formulated their positions in a cautious manner. 130  The
representatives of Mexico and Syria were more emphatic that a
second resolution was necessary for the lawful recourse to the
use of force. 31
J3y adopting a resolution with such an ambiguous
formulation, and given the overall context of the crisis and the
firm position of the United States, the members of the Council
acquiesced to the risk of establishing expectations that an
authorization was indeed part of the resolution. The
subsequent practice of the US and the UK, seeking a second
resolution, and their failure,' 32 is a strong indication that it
would not be appropriate to interpret Resolution 1441/2002 as
conferring an explicit, even if conditional, authorization for the
use of force. However, both the resolution and the UNMOVIC
practice before the initiation of hostilities offered substantial
legitimacy moments for the intervention, by stressing the
existence of major risks arising from the ambiguity and
incalculability of Iraq's policies.' 33
128. S.C. Res. 1441, supra note 117, T 12.
129. The U.S. representative stated, "If the Security Council fails to act
decisively in the event of further Iraqi violations, this resolution does not constrain
any Member State from acting to defend itself against the threat posed by Iraq or to
enforce relevant United Nations resolutions and protect world peace and security."
U.N. SCOR, 57th Sess., 4644th mtg. at 3, U.N. Doc. S/PV.4644 (Nov. 8, 2002).
130. Id. at 5-13. These three members reiterated their common position in a
public statement following the session of the UNSC. See Pierre Klein, Opdration
Iraqi Freedom: Peut-on admettre l' argument de l" "autorisation implicite" du Conseil
de Sgcuritg?, REvUE BELGE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL, 205, 217 (2003).
131. U.N. SCOR, 57th Sess., 4644th mtg. at 6-10, U.N. Doc. S/PV.4644 (Nov. 8,
2002). On the interpretation of the Security Council resolutions, see also Efthymios
Papastavridis, Interpretation of Security Council Resolutions Under Chapter VII in
the Aftermath of the Iraqi Crisis, 56 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 83 (2007).
132. Sean Murphy, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to
International Law, 97 AM J. INT'L L. 419, 423-24 (2003).
133. This ambiguity seems to have had structural reasons. A recent study based




The Security Council's stance after the end of the war
reaffirms the UN's indirect, albeit unwilling, endorsement of the
US interventionist policies. In a second round of resolutions, the
legitimacy of the intervention was affirmed on three categories
of grounds: a) de-legitimation of the authority of the previous
Iraqi regime; b) explicit authorization for the continued presence
of the Coalition armed forces in Iraq; and c) constitutional
legitimacy, in support of self-determination of the Iraqi people.
UNSC Resolution 1483/2003 was adopted under Chapter
VII on May 22, 2003, nearly a month after the occupation of
Iraq. It de-legitimized the previous regime, by requiring all UN
member states to freeze funds, other assets or economic
resources of the previous Government, of Saddam Hussein or of
senior officials of the former Iraqi regime and their immediate
family members. 13 4  In a further step, UNSC Resolution
1511/2003 put the violent activities against the occupying
powers within the broader context of combating terrorism, by
invoking, in the same paragraph of the preamble, Resolutions
1483 and 1500/2003, together with Resolution 1373/2001.135
Moreover, UNSC Resolution 1511/2003 explicitly authorized the
presence of the Coalition forces in Iraq and the eventual use of
force for the maintenance of stability in the country. 136
The Security Council also conferred constitutional
legitimacy to the intervention through its support to
constitutional reconstruction of the country and its institutions.
In that way, the new state of affairs brought about by the
intervention was deemed to promote the international interest
of peace and stability, as defined by the Council. UNSC
part of the strategy of the Iraqi regime not to dispel the doubts surrounding the
existence of weapons of mass destruction. See Kevin Woods, James Lacey, &
Williamson Murray, Saddam's Delusions: The View from the Inside, 85 FOREIGN
AFF. 3., 2, 5-8 (2006). In parallel, for a sharp critique of the politicization of
intelligence by the U.S. administration during the time preceding the invasion of
Iraq, see Paul R. Pillar, Intelligence, Policy, and the War in Iraq, 85 FOREIGN AFF. 2.,
15 (2006).
134. S.C. Res. 1483, 1 23, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1483 (May 23, 2003).
135. S.C. Res. 1511, pmbl. 1, 5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1511 (October 16, 2003). In
a recent Statement of its President, the Security Council condemned in the strongest
terms the terrorist attacks in Iraq, rejecting thus any notion that they might
constitute acts of legitimate insurgency, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/2007/11 (April 13, 2007).
136. S.C. Res. 1511, supra note 135, [ 13, 15. The Security Council extended
the presence of the multinational force in Iraq until the end of 2007 upon request of
the Iraqi government, S.C. Res. 1723, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1723 (November 28, 2006)
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Resolution 1483/2003 sought to accomplish a broad range of
objectives in this context: lifting the UN sanctions against
Iraq;137 calling upon the occupying powers to support the Iraqi
people by the establishment of a representative government
based on the rule of law; 138 and authorizing these powers to
disburse the funds in the Development Fund of Iraq for the
economic reconstruction of the country. 139
Some of these provisions conferred upon the occupying
powers rights that exceed the limitations imposed by Article 43
of the Hague Regulations and Article 64 of the Geneva
Convention IV, which states that "the penal laws of the occupied
territory shall remain in force, with the exception that they may
be repealed or suspended by the occupying power in cases where
they constitute a threat to its security or an obstacle to the
application of the present Convention." The provision describes
the continuity of the legal system on the occupied territory;
according to the authoritative Commentary of the ICRC, Art. 64
secures not only the criminal law but the totality of the legal
order of the occupied territory, including its constitution. 140
Nonetheless, the legislation adopted by the Coalition
Provisional Authority (CPA) was directed toward a radical
transformation of the political and legal system of Iraq. This
legislation had a clear "constitutional basis" in UNSC
Resolution 1483/2003, which is referred to in the preamble of
regulations and orders adopted by the CPA. Moreover, this
legislation provided for the establishment of a free market
economy in Iraq. 141
137. S.C. Res. 1483, supra note 134, 10.
138. Id. pmbl. 5, and oper. part 4, 8c.
139. Id. 14.
140. See the Commentary on that article at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/COM380-
600071?OpenDocument (last accessed on 05/12/07). On the problematic relationship
between state-building and law of occupation, see, e.g., Brett H. McGurk, Revisiting
the Law of Nation-Building: Iraq in Transition, 45 VA. J. INT'L L. 451 (2005);
Antonio F. Perez, Legal Frameworks for Economic Transition in Iraq - Occupation
Under the Law of War vs. Global Governance Under the Law of Peace, 18
TRANSNAT'L L. 53 (2005).
141. The preamble of the CPA Order 39 on Foreign Investment the CPA
Administration states the following:
Acting in a manner consistent with the Report of the Secretary General to
the Security Council of July 17, 2003, concerning the need for the
development of Iraq and its transition from a non-transparent centrally
planned economy to a market economy characterized by sustainable
economic growth through the establishment of a dynamic private sector,
and the need to enact institutional and legal reforms to give it effect.
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Furthermore, UNSC Resolutions 1500 and 1511/2003
explicitly conferred legitimacy to the new regime of Iraq, by
recognizing the Iraqi Governing Council as "broadly
representative" 142  and by stating that it "embodies the
sovereignty of the State of Iraq during the transitional period
until an internationally recognized, representative government
is established and assumes the responsibilities of the
Authority."1 43 Despite the progression of Iraq to full sovereignty
and democratic governance, 44 the complexities of the situation
became apparent over time through a series of adverse
developments, including the intensification of the civil
conflict,1 45 and the violation of human rights by the occupying
powers. 46 Nonetheless, these factors are not capable of
transforming the intervention into an illegitimate and illegal
aggression. 47
CPA Order 39, pmbl. CPA/ORD/19 September 2003/39. See inter alia, Trade
Liberalization Policy 2004, CPA Order 54, pmbl., CPA/ORD/24 February 2004/54;
Trade Bank of Iraq, CPA Order 20, CPAIORD/17 July 2003/20; Measures to Ensure
the Independence of the Central Bank of Iraq, CPA Order 18, CPA/ORD/07 July
2003/18. See also Alan Audi, note, Iraq's New Investment Law and the Standard of
Civilization: A Case Study on the Limits of International Law, 93 GEO. L. J. , 335
(2004).
142. S.C. Res. 1500, $ 1, S/RES/1500 (August 14, 2003).
143. S.C. Res. 1511, supra note 135, 1 4.
144. On the new democratic Constitution of Iraq, see Nathan Brown, Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, The Final Draft of the Iraqi Constitution -
Analysis and Commentary,
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/flles/FinalDraftSeptl6.pdf (last accessed on
05/12/07). See also, Report of the Public International Law and Policy Group and the
Century Foundation, Establishing a Stable Democratic Constitutional Structure in
Iraq: Some Basic Considerations, 39 NEw ENG. L. REV. 53 (2004); Brown, supra note
25.
145. The National Intelligence Council of the United States made the following
assessment in January, 2007:
The Intelligence Community judges that the term 'civil war' does not
adequately capture the complexity of the conflict in Iraq, which includes
extensive Shia-on-Shia violence, al-Qa'ida and Sunni insurgent attacks on
Coalition forces, and widespread criminally motivated violence.
Nonetheless, the term 'civil war' accurately describes key elements of the
Iraqi conflict, including the hardening of ethno-secterian identities, a sea
change in the character of violence, ethno-sectarian mobilization, and
population displacements.
NAT'L INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL, NAT'L INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE, PROSPECTS FOR
IRAQ'S STABILITY: A CHALLENGING ROAD AHEAD, 7 (2007).
146. Supra note 65.
147. But see Joseph Betz, America's 2003 War of Aggression Against Iraq, 9
Nexus J. Op., 145 (2004) (basing the character of the intervention as aggression on
arguments of a legal and of ethical order).
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3. Conclusion
The UN system conferred legitimacy to the 2003
intervention in Iraq, albeit hesitantly. The intervention exhibits
elements of "forcible countermeasures for the restoration of
peace," as it was undertaken with the purpose of enforcing the
UN resolutions on the disarmament of Iraq, in the mistaken
belief that Iraq had not fully disarmed at that time. The further
practice of the UN Security Council under Chapter VII shows
clearly the support of the international community for the
efforts of the intervening powers to promote nation-building and
democratization in Iraq. Taking into account the de-legitimation
of the previous regime through the pertinent resolutions, the
conclusion may be drawn, that, in legal terms, the intervention
has not constituted a threat to the peace under the UN Charter,
but a means for restoring peace in the region.
D. ISRAEL V. HEZBOLLAH (2006)
Josd Alvarez, President of the American Society of
International Law (ASIL), framed the 2006 armed conflict as
one between Israel and Hezbollah, and not between Israel and
Lebanon. 148 This interpretation is affirmed by the practice of
the UN Security Council, which called for a full cessation of
hostilities between Israel and Hezbollah. 149 Though under the
rules of international state responsibility Hezbollah's acts can
be attributed to the state of Lebanon,150 this is beyond the point:
As is to be seen, the tenor of the Security Council resolutions is
148. The Guns of August, 22 ASIL NEWSLE ITER 5., 1 (2006). See also the
contributions of Frederic Kirgis, Douglass Cassel, Richard Falk et al, focusing in
particular on the potential violation of the principle of proportionality, On the
complex history of Lebanon and its relationship with Israel and the other countries
of the region, see Fouad Ajami, Lebanon and its Inheritors, 63 FOREIGN AFF. 778
(1984-1985); Lebanon: Country Profile, 1 INT'L J. REFUGEE L., 331 (1989); Louis Ren6
Beres, Israel, Lebanon and Hizbullah: A Jurisprudential Assessment, 14 ARIZ. J.
INT'L & CoMP. L. 141 (1997); Itamar Rabinovich, Israel, Syria, and Lebanon, 45 INTL
J. 529 (1989-1990).
149. S.C. Res. 1701, 1, S/RES/1701 (August 11, 2006).
150. Hezbollah participates in the Lebanese political system and, before the
2006, exercised control over the Southern part of the country. See Daniel Byman,
Should Hezbollah Be Next?, 82 FOREIGN AFF. 54 (2003); Daniel Byman, Hezbollah's
Dilemma, April 13, 2005 (author's update), available at
http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20050413faupdate84277/daniel-byman/hezbollah-s-
dilemma.html (last accessed on 05/12/07); Joshua Slomich, The Ta'if Accord:
Legalizing the Syrian Occupation of Lebanon, 22 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L.REv. 619,
633 (1998-1999). See also G.A. Res. 56/83, Annex, arts . 4-11, supra note 43. (ILC
articles on state responsibility, relating to the attribution of a conduct to a state).
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that the actions of Hezbollah have, in principle, generated the
threat to the peace, while Israel's role was considered as more
ambiguous, at least from a normative standpoint. It needs
therefore to be explored, whether Israel's attack against
Hezbollah constituted a hegemonic intervention that had the
purpose to restore peace in the region.
First, there are clear indications that Israel's military
action in 2006 grossly violated the principle of proportionality.
Second, the United Nations, not least the ICJ,1 1 had stressed
the responsibility of this state for major violations of
international law that have contributed to the worsening of the
overall situation in the Middle East. Moreover, Israel cannot
seriously claim the authority of enforcing reform in an Arab
country. Third, taking into account Hezbollah's participation in
the Lebanese political system, 15 2 it is not clear, whether the
organization's activities can be positioned within the rationale of
the system of terror, as defined above. 153 If Hezbollah acts
within the decentralized military system, 54 and not within the
terror system, the conflict may have only regional impact and
significance, which, despite its complexity, may, in the
assessment of the Security Council, not necessarily constitute a
global threat.
UNSC Resolution 1701/2006 was adopted at the conclusion
of the armed conflict and determined that the situation in
Lebanon constituted a threat to international peace and
security.1 5 The threat had three distinct components of tension
that culminated in the Lebanese crisis of 2006: (1) the three-
decades old conflict between Israel and Lebanon;156 (2) the
Syrian intervention in Lebanon;157 and (3) the armed conflict in
the summer of 2006 itself.158 .
The first element of the threat to the peace relates to the
military intervention of Israel in Lebanon that peaked with the
1982 war and its aftermath. Resolution 1701 recalled Resolution
151. See Legal Consequences of Construction of a Wall in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, 2004 I.C.J. 131, 163 (July 9, 2004).
152. Supra note 150.
153. Supra, Section IA.
154. Id.
155. S.C. Res. 1701, pmbl. 1 10, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1701 (Aug. 11, 2006).
156. Id., referencing S.C. Res. 425, U.N. Doc. S/RES/425 (Mar. 19, 1978), S.C.
Res. 426, U.N. Doc S/RES/426 (Mar. 19, 1978), and S.C. Res. 520, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/520 (Sept. 17, 1982).
157. Id., referencing to S.C. Res. 1559, U.N. Doc S/RES/1559 (Sept. 2, 2004) and
S.C. Res. 1680, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1680 (May 17, 2006).
158. Id. pmbl. 1$ 2-3.
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425/1978, 426/1978, 520/1982, in which the Council had
condemned the Israeli military activities in Lebanon and its
incursions into Beirut, and had called upon Israel to cease its
military action against Lebanon. 159 Although the President of
the Security Council welcomed the withdrawal of Israel from
Southern Lebanon in 2000,160 the restoration of peace in the
area had not been fully achieved; the mandate of UNIFIL was
extended therefore over a number of years. In the last extension
before the 2006 war, both the UN Security Council and the UN
Secretary General determined that the armed activities of
Hezbollah across the Israeli-Lebanese border were
predominantly responsible for the ongoing threat to the peace. 161
The Council decided that UNIFIL's mandate should be extended
until the end of July 2006, and that the peacekeepers should
focus on the restoration of peace in the area, after having
fulfilled the rest of their mandate, and having ensured the
withdrawal of the Israeli troops from Lebanon. 62 The Council
condemned "all acts of violence, including the latest serious
incidents across the Blue Line initiated from the Lebanese
side,"' 63 reiterated "its call upon the Government of Lebanon to
fully extend and exercise its sole and effective authority
throughout the South," 64 and encouraged UNIFIL to assist the
Lebanese Government to assert this authority.165 Therefore, the
initial threat, as determined by UNSC Resolutions 425 and
426/1978, had mutated: the restoration of peace was obstructed
by the armed activities of Hezbollah.
The second source of the threat to the peace was related to
the intervention of Syria in Lebanon. In Resolution 1559/2004,
the Council declared "its support for a free and fair electoral
process in Lebanon's upcoming presidential election conducted
according to Lebanese constitutional rules devised without
foreign interference or influence,"' 66 and noted its grave concern
due to "the continued presence of armed militias in Lebanon,
159. Id. pmbl. 1 1.
160. Statement by the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc.
SiPRST/2000/21 (June 18, 2000).
161. S.C. Res. 1655, pmbl., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1655 (Jan. 31, 2006); Report of the
Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, U.N. Doc.
S/2006/26 (Jan. 18, 2006).
162. S.C. Res. 1655, supra note 161, pmbl. 3.
163. Id. oper. part 4.
164. Id. 6.
165. Id. 10.
166. S.C. Res. 1559, supra note 157, 5.
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which prevent the Lebanese Government from exercising its full
sovereignty over all Lebanese territory."167 It also noted "the
determination of Lebanon to ensure the withdrawal of all non-
Lebanese forces from Lebanon." 168 The Resolution called for the
"disbanding and disarmament of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese
militias." 169
Later, in Resolution 1680/2006, the Council asked Syria to
contribute to the restoration of peace by delineating its common
border, and establishing diplomatic relations, with Lebanon.
The Council stressed that some of the provisions of Resolution
1559/2004 had not been complied with, namely, inter alia, the
"disbanding and disarming of Lebanese and non-Lebanese
militias [and] the extension of the control of the Government of
Lebanon over all its territory."170 The Council also commended
"the Government of Lebanon for undertaking measures against
movements of arms into Lebanese territory and call[ed] on the
Government of Syria to take similar measures. "171
It can be inferred from the above that the presence and
activities of the Hezbollah and Syria constitute major elements
of the threat to the peace in the area; the disarmament of
militias and the termination of movements of arms to these
militias are measures considered by the Council as promoting
the restoration of peace. The objective of the resolutions was to
restore the full control of the Lebanese Government in the
country through the disarmament of the various militias that
were provoking armed clashes with Israel on a regular basis.
The third element of the threat, as determined by UNSC
Resolution 1701/2006 was directly related with the 2006 armed
conflict. The Council attributed to Hezbollah the responsibility
for the conflict by expressing "its utmost concern at the
continuing escalation of hostilities in Lebanon and in Israel
since Hezbollah's attack on Israel on 12 July 2006." 172 It also
emphasized "the need for an end to violence" and "the need to
address urgently the causes that have given rise to the current
crisis, including by the unconditional release of the abducted
Israeli soldiers."1 73 Thus, on the one hand, the Council did not
167. Id. pmbl. 4.
168. Id. pmbl. 3.
169. Id. oper. part T 3.
170. S.C. Res. 1680, supra note 157, pmbl. 3.
171. Id. oper. part 5.
172. S.C. Res. 1701, supra note 155, pmbl. 2.
173. Id. pmbl. T1 3.
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directly consider the issue of the release of the soldier as a
matter of negotiations; on the other, it "encouraged" the efforts
for settling the issues of the Lebanese prisoners in Israel. 174 Far
from being expressions of "comity," these provisions are
indicative for the attribution of responsibility for the threat to
the peace. Moreover, the Council welcomed the commitment of
the Lebanese Government "to extend its authority over its
territory, through its own legitimate armed forces." 175 Here, the
Council directly stressed the "illegitimacy" of all other armed
groups, including the Hezbollah.
Resolution 1701/2006 did not explicitly determine the
Israeli action as an "invasion" or "aggression," but as an element
of the threat to the peace, as it acknowledged that the armed
conflict itself "caused hundreds of deaths and injuries on both
sides."1 76 Moreover, the preamble of the resolution referred to
the Statement of the President of the Council of July 30, 2006,
in which the Council condemned the dozens of killings of
civilians in Qana by Israel. 177 The Council also called for an
immediate cessation of all Israeli "offensive military
operations." 7 8 One possible interpretation would be that the
Israeli military operation has been "offensive" as a whole.
However, the provision was criticized by the representative of
Lebanon for the exactly opposite reason, namely, because it
allegedly indicated that Israel should cease only the "offensive"
and not the "defensive" operations, and thus permitted Israel to
use force, under conditions, without violating its obligations
under the Resolution. 79
The Israeli armed attack has indeed been deemed an
element of the threat to the peace in the context of the Lebanese
crisis. First, this is evidenced by the obligation of Israel to
withdraw its armed forces from the country; unlike the
intervening forces in Kosovo or Iraq, the Israeli army is not
acceptable to the Security Council as a stabilizing force in
Lebanon. Second, the Israeli attack undermined another
objective of the international community, the restoration of the
174. Id. pmbl. 4.
175. Id. pmbl. 5 (emphasis added).
176. Id. pmbl. T 2.
177. Id. pmbl. 1 1; Statement by the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc.
S/PRST/2006/35 (July 30, 2006).
178. S.C. Res. 1701, supra note 155, 1.
179. See U.N. SCOR, 61st Sess., 5508th mtg. at 4, U.N. Doc. S/PV.5508 (Aug. 8,




authority of the Lebanese government, by affecting its capacity
to exercise effective control over the country. The Israeli
intervention thus undercut the prospects of the long-term
reform of the Lebanese political system, and strengthened the
polarization of Lebanese society. 8 0
As a consequence of the Israeli action, the Security Council
took measures to contain the activities of Hezbollah. Under the
terms of Security Council Resolution 1701, UNIFIL was
strengthened through the addition of new forces and its
mandate was enhanced. Lebanon agreed to deploy an armed
force of 15,000 men in the South that would displace the,
Hezbollah from the Lebanese-Israeli border.1 8' Moreover,
Hezbollah became a target of sanctions under a Chapter VII
resolution: the Council required "the disarmament of all armed
groups in Lebanon, so that . . .there will be no weapons or
authority in Lebanon other than that of the Lebanese State" and
that there should be "no sales or supply of arms and related
materiel to Lebanon except as authorized by its Government."8 2
The resolution established that UNIFIL should assist the
Lebanese government "to exercise its authority throughout the
territory" and "to ensure that its area of operations is not
utilized for hostile activities of any kind." 8 3 The Government of
Lebanon was called upon "to secure its borders and other entry
points to prevent the entry in Lebanon without its consent of
arms or related materiel,"'84 and all states were required to
impose an arms embargo against Hezbollah.185 It remains to be
seen whether and to what extent these provisions are effectively
implemented, and what impact they will have on the volatile
socio-political environment of the region.
In any event, these measures did not confer upon the Israeli
military operation the character of a hegemonic intervention,
since the use of force by Israel lacked any vision with respect to
repressing the alleged terrorist threat, or to providing an
impetus for domestic reform in Lebanon. Although Hezbollah's
illegal actions triggered the armed conflict and its long-term
aggressive strategy constitutes a major destabilizing factor in
180. On the complex situation in Lebanon after the 2006 armed conflict, see
Paul Salem, The Future of Lebanon, 85 FOREIGN AFF. 6., 13 (2006).
181. S.C. Res. 1701, supra note 155, pmbl. $ 8.
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the region, the Security Council positioned Israel's actions
squarely within the network of actions that constituted the
threat to peace and stability.18 6 There is no indication in
Security Council Resolution 1701 that the international
community recognized any privileged or follow-up role for Israel
in the Lebanese domestic affairs. Under these circumstances,
the conclusion can be drawn Israel exercised non-proportionate
armed reprisals or countermeasures18 7  against Lebanon,
triggered by Hezbollah's attack on July 12, 2006.188 However,
Israel is under no obligation to pay compensation for damages
inflicted on Hezbollah during the armed conflict.
III. LEGITIMACY OF HEGEMONIC INTERVENTION: A
GENERAL PRINCIPLE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
RELATIONS
This section presents a provisional sketch of the legal
nature and legitimacy of hegemonic intervention, as it appears
in international practice. Despite considerable ambiguity, and
although the various elements of the principle are still in flux,
its fundamental features are visible and real.
As the hegemonic use of force serves the attainment of the
purposes of the international community, its legal nature can be
explained as a hybrid form of "collective enforcement" and
individual self-help, since the threat to the peace affects both
the international interest and the interests of the intervening
states. The form of "forcible countermeasures for the
restoration of peace" 8 9 broadly corresponds to the rationale of
the hegemonic intervention, even if particular aspects of the
interventions could be viewed under alternative legal bases. 190
186. See supra note 177. As a consequence, Israel had to withdraw all of its
forces from Lebanon within a short period of time. See S.C. Res. 1701, supra note
155, T 2.
187. On this form of the use of force, see Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran
v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. 161, 331 (Nov. 6, 2003) (Simma J, separate opinion, 12-14).
188. S.C. Res. 1701, supra note 181, pmbl. 2. On the implementation of the
resolution, see the Report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of Security
Council Resolution 1701 (2006), U.N. Doc. S/2007/147 (Mar. 14, 2007).
189. This form combines the notion of countermeasures not involving the use of
force, G.A. Res. 56/83, Annex, arts. 49-54, supra note 43, with the notion of
enforcement measures involving the use of force, U.N. Charter art. 42, in cases in
which there is no explicit authorization by the UNSC. See also Cassese, Ex iniuria
ius oritur, supra note 75; Cassese, A Follow-Up, supra note 75.
190. Cf., e.g., S.C. Res. 661, pmbl. 5-7, U.N. Doc. S/RES/661 (Aug. 6, 1990)
(stating that the Security Council acted under Chapter VII while simultaneously
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Overall, these parallel and partial legal bases strengthen the
rationale of the hegemonic intervention, and lend support to its
legitimacy.
The hegemonic intervention does not generate international
state responsibility for the intervening powers, because this
would be inconsistent with Security Council resolutions and
with the broader international legal interest. Reparations in
favor of the target state or entity, and re-establishment of the
status-quo ante would amount to the restoration of the threat to
the peace. Instead, the intervening powers have the obligation
to promote state-building and reconstruction of the territory
through structural reform and through significant financial
contributions. This is the logical consequence of an enforcement
action that claims to safeguard global interests and promote
domestic reform. If the intervening powers fail to provide the
necessary assistance for reconstruction and take the necessary
measures for the control of the source of the risks in the
territory, the use of force may then lose its legitimacy and its
privileged status in international law.
These features already create a predictable pattern of
response of the international community toward major risks. It
can be expected that, as long as the potential success of the
hegemonic intervention would make everyone better off, and the
potential failure would make everyone irreversibly worse off, the
UN system would be induced to confer legitimacy to the
hegemonic powers. This situation might change, if the "risk of
failure" of the hegemonic use of force is transformed into quasi-
certainty, or is radically transformed into an instrument of
direct political domination by the major powers. That might be
the case if the hegemonic powers change their policies and
instead of "state-building," they orient themselves to direct and
long-term occupation and administration of foreign territories.
The hegemonic intervention would then have lost its raison-
d'tre and would have been transformed into a wholly illegal and
illegitimate use of force: the intervention would not provide
support for the infrastructure of global societal pluralism, but
would attempt to establish a hierarchically organized global
political system equivalent to that of the colonial era. Instead of
providing any support for imperialism of that kind, the member
states of the Security Council might then invoke blocking the
affirming the right of individual or collective self-defense under Article 51 of the
United Nations Charter).
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operation of the organ as the best alternative for the
maintenance of international peace.
John Yoo developed a concept for intervention based on an
international public goods approach that deserves some
discussion. Yoo criticizes "imminence" as a necessary condition
for the legitimate exercise of self-defense. Instead, he adopts the
criterion of risk and stresses that the use of force by a state
should be assessed "against the expected harm of an attack, as
measured by probability and magnitude of harm."191 He
considers that the international legal system has developed a
norm that states may use force in cases of breakdown of order,
terrorism, or humanitarian crises without Security Council
authorization. 192 He argues that such actions "are then judged
ex post in the form of other nations' decisions to recognize the
results of the intervention or to assist in bearing the cost."193 He
advocates a reform of the UN law on the use of force that would
loosen the existing system and replace the ex ante rules on the
use of force by ex post standards enabling the balancing of the
relevant factors. 194
Though Yoo seems to construe a risk-oriented
interpretation and critique of international law, he, in fact,
negates risk as uncertainty. By considering the risk of
humanitarian crises or terrorist attacks as an ontologically
given factor to be detected and affirmed by the intervening
state, he normatively treats it as an ascertainable fact, instead
of perceiving it as an assessment: the risk is not "out there", but
in the decision itselfl Thus, he disregards the complexity of risk
cognizance and risk management as a collective communication
process within the international community. It is questionable
whether his categories would enable a distinction, even ex post,
between a hegemonic intervention and a regional conflict
involving the use of force against allegedly terrorist groups.
Moreover, he does not take the inherent risks of hegemonic
intervention into account; these risks are mirrored in the
normative indeterminacy of the institution of "forcible
countermeasures for the restoration of peace." Furthermore, if
Yoo's balancing standard on the use of force were to be
understood as a new primary rule of international law explicitly
191. John Yoo, Force Rules: UN Reform and Intervention, 6 CHI. J. INT'L L. 641,
652 (2005-2006).
192. Id. at 657.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 653.
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conferring authority to intervene under the UN Charter, it
would create a factual presumption in favour of the legality of
intervention and first use of force. An ex post standard might
indeed function, but only under the presumption that the
hegemonic intervention is considered prima facie illegal.
It does not seem probable that the hegemonic intervention
and the forcible countermeasures for the restoration of peace
will assume the status of an enabling rule of international law
any time soon. Among the main factors obstructing the
emergence of new norms in the area of the law of the use of force
is not only the lack of state consent, but the lack of opinio juris
as well as the worldwide societal protest and scandalization due
to the collateral and predictable violations of the international
humanitarian law being the fallout of the hegemonic project. 195
The generally critical stance of the academic community of
international law, and the inherent indeterminacy of the
hegemonic intervention itself, are additional factors speaking
against the stabilization of a new norm of international law.
Last, but not least, the complexity of the objectives of the
intervening powers, the high cost of the intervention, the long-
term commitment of resources, the lack of capacity or
willingness of local actors to cooperate with the hegemonic
powers or with the international community for the restoration
of peace, indicate the limits of the hegemonic intervention as an
emerging institution of our era.196 We may assume that another
principal reason for the constrictions in the effectiveness of the
hegemonic intervention is the enormity of the task of reforming
the social structures at the periphery of the world society by
force, or against the will of the local populations. Though
evolution cannot be predicted, the recognition of the hegemonic
use of force as a norm of international law seems to be in dead-
end. Reform of the respective rules of the UN Charter, or
codification of the existing practice, seems unlikely under these
conditions.
However, hegemonic intervention is ingrained in the power
195. See supra Section IB(2) in fine.
196. On the challenges of the transition, see indicatively William Maley,
Democratic Governance and Post-Conflict Transitions, 6 CHI. J. OF INT'L L. 683
(2005-2006); JAMES A. BAKER, III, LEE H. HAMILTON et al., THE IRAQ STUDY GROUP
REPORT (2006); Derick W. Brinkerhoff & James B. Mayfield, Democratic Governance
in Iraq? Progress and Peril in Reforming State-Society Relations, 25 PUB. ADMIN.
AND DEv. 59 (2005); Dennis A. Rondinelli & John D. Montgomery, Regime Change
and Nation Building: Can Donors Restore Governance in Post-Conflict States? 25
PUB. ADMIN. AND DEV. 15 (2005).
20071
MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT'L LAW
structure and in the normative architecture of the contemporary
international system as a predictable and legitimate, even if
desperate, pattern of response to unexpected eruptions of
violence of global reach and to the emergence of mega-risks of
similar nature. States need to affirm their authority and
sovereignty by ensuring peace and stability through risk
prevention; they cannot afford not to act in the face of the
escalating and destabilizing activities of transnational actors.
The Charter's standard on the law of the use of force faces
difficulties to accommodate these new challenges.
Even if the lack of effectiveness leads to the reconsideration
of the policies of intervention, in particular, of some aspects of
its social engineering pillar, the possibility of undertaking a
hegemonic intervention will be present at the horizon of the
world community as a threat, a measure of last resort and as a
possibility to reckon. A major failure, miscalculation or
intelligence shortcoming, or even the catastrophic outcome of a
military operation, is not, as such, capable of rendering the
hegemonic intervention as interaction pattern in global society
normatively obsolete. Since the intervention is legitimate as a
risk-prevention mechanism, failure as a possible outcome is
already built into the expectation structures of world societal
actors.
The preventability of mega-harm arising from decentralized
and transnational violence is intimately inter-connected with
the eventuality of success or failure of the intervention. If acting
under uncertainty is the basis of its legitimacy, then failure
alone cannot de-legitimize the institution, but might even
strengthen both the awareness of the risk and the need to
improve intelligence, information gathering and planning.197
Erosion of political support for a specific project does not imply
erosion of the normative foundations of the hegemonic
intervention as a whole, but leads rather to a stronger self-
restraint on the part of the intervening powers.
As episodic interaction pattern, the hegemonic intervention
has sought and found temporarily a secure place at the
evolutionary stage of selection. For the time being,
international jurisprudence does not seem to oppose its
stabilization at that stage, and this is evidenced by the practice
197. See Elizabeth Rindskopf-Parker, Intelligence and the Use of Force in the
War on Terrorism, 98 AM. SOCY INT'L L. PRocs. 147 (2004). See also Richard K
Betts, The New Politics of Intelligence: Will Reforms Work This Time? 83 FOREIGN
AFF. 3., 2 (2004).
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of the International Court of Justice. The ICJ did not have the
opportunity to rule on the merits of the Lockerbie case, and to
express itself on the possibility of judicial review of the decisions
of the Security Council.198 Moreover, the Court declined from
deciding on the merits of the application of Yugoslavia against
NATO Member States for the Kosovo intervention, 199 and in the
Oil Platforms case it decided questions of the use of force on the
basis of the bilateral Amity Treaty between Iran and the United
States and not directly on the basis of the UN Charter.200 The
Congo v. Uganda case demonstrated the nature of predatory
regional conflicts, 201 and made the contradistinction to the
hegemonic use of force more plausible. Moreover, in its 1996
advisory opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear
Weapons, the ICJ declared a non-liquet with respect to recourse
to nuclear strategy "in an extreme circumstance of self-defense,
in which the very survival of a State is at stake".20 2
The clear dichotomy between legality and illegality is being
progressively displaced by a broader balancing exercise among
necessity, proportionality and enforcement of international
objectives-but the general presumption is against the legality
198. Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal
Convention Arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya
v. U.K.), Order, 2003 I.C.J. (Sept. 10, 2003). See also Questions of Interpretation
and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising from the Aerial Incident at
Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. U.K.), Preliminary Objections 1998 I.C.J. 115
(Feb. 27, 1998).
199. Legality of Use of Force (Serb. & Mont. v. Belg.), Preliminary Objections,
2004 I.C.J. 279 (Dec. 15, 2004), and seven other similar cases brought by Yugoslavia
against NATO member states. The Court held that it lacked jurisdiction to decide
these cases, because at the time of the filing of the applications on April 29, 1999,
Serbia and Montenegro was not a member of the United Nations, 179. However, in
the Case Concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herzeg. v. Serb. & Mont.),
Preliminary Objections, 1996 I.C.J. 595 (July 11, 1996), the Court had decided that
it had jurisdiction to entertain the claims of Bosnia and Herzegovina; later, in the
same case Concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herzeg. v. Serb. & Mont.), Judgment,
2007 (Febr. 27, 2007), the Court, rejected Serbia's jurisdictional objection, which was
based on the Legality of the Use of Force jurisprudence of 2004,by invoking the res
judicata of its 1996 judgment ($ 140)!
200. Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. 161, 326
(November 6, 2003) (see the critique of Simma J separate opinion, 5-8).
201. See Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem.
Rep. Congo v. Uganda), 2005 I.C.J. (December 19, 2005).
202. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Adv. Op., 1996 I.C.J.
226, 266, (July 8, 1996) 105(2)E; see also the critique of Achilles Skordas,
Epilegomena to a Silence: Nuclear Weapons, Terrorism and the Moment of Concern,
6 J. CONFLICT & SEC. L. 191 (2001).
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of the hegemonic intervention. The "forcible countermeasures
for the restoration of peace" may, however, depending on the
balancing exercise among the above normative factors, and
considering risk and effectiveness of the operation, reach the
threshold of legality in individual cases of hegemonic use of
force. This is one of the most significant ramifications of the
legitimacy of the hegemonic intervention. Indeed, as the form of
forcible countermeasures may overlap with other established
exceptions to the prohibition of the use of force (Arts. 42 and 51
of the UN Charter), it may advance their dynamic-evolutionary
interpretation, or close gaps. Lastly, an intervention that does
not enjoy any legally significant institutional support in the
international community is both illegal and illegitimate.
In this sense, the legitimacy of hegemonic intervention
should be considered as a general principle of international legal
relations. Fragmented, precarious, flexible, as it might be, this
principle reflects the foundational uncertainties and the
stability deceptions of a pluralistic, non-hierarchical,
spontaneous and turbulent global (dis)order.
CONCLUSION
There are strong reasons to consider the use of force against
Yugoslavia (1999), Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003) as legally
privileged hegemonic interventions that were undertaken with
the objective to restore international peace and security. The
2006 Israeli attack against the Hezbollah did not have a similar
character, as it is evidenced by the response of the international
community. The hegemonic intervention is not an evolutionary
achievement, but rather the outcome of stalled evolution of the
law of the use of force that has taken the form of a general
principle of international legal relations. The practice of the
United Nations reveals that the legitimacy of hegemonic
intervention depends not so much on what states declare, but on
how they interact in international institutions and how they in
fact respond to major risks for global stability. Moreover, the
hegemonic character of an intervention is not itself a given
feature of a conflict, but it evolves together with the ongoing
response of the international community over time. Legitimacy
or illegitimacy is established by interpretations of international
law, including Security Council resolutions, and state and
societal practice. The output of this methodological inquiry is
more than a purely academic exercise: it may contribute to the
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clarification of rights and obligations of the parties involved in
an armed conflict, despite the persisting uncertainties with
regard to the character of the military operation as legal or
illegal. This is, after all, the gain for conceptualizing a
"privileged" form of the use of force.

